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MANDATORY PREDISPUTE CONSUMER
ARBITRATION, STRUCTURAL BIAS, AND
INCENTIVIZING PROCEDURAL
SAFEGUARDS
Nancy A. Welsh*
INTRODUCTION

Within the past several decades, there has been an explosion in the
creation, institutionalization and use of "alternative" dispute resolution
procedures. Understood broadly, these procedures include formal and
informal administrative adjudication, as well as arbitration, mediation and
other court-connected and agency-connected innovations. In general,
reformers conceived these "alternative" processes as means to end legal (or
potentially legal) disputes and escape the perceived costs and inadequacies
of traditional civil litigation and trials. Over the years, and perhaps counterintuitively, courts have embraced these processes. Indeed, courts have
become such advocates for these processes that they have mandated their
use in litigation (in the case of court-connected mediation), enforced rules
that make their use a condition precedent to court access (in the case of
administrative adjudication), and enforced their use pursuant to contract

* William Trickett Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law, Penn State University, Dickinson
School of Law. I wish to extend heartfelt thanks to those who participated in workshops at the
AALS ADR Section's annual conference, University of Missouri School of Law, Fordham
University School of Law and the AALS Works-in-Progress Symposium at Ohio State University,
Moritz College of Law for their insights and questions, with special thanks to John Lande,
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Ron Aronovsky and Catherine Rogers. I am very grateful for the
excellent research assistance provided by David Brown, Kevin Schock, and Katie Rimpfel. And
final thanks must be given to Penn State University, Dickinson School of Law, and Dean Philip
McConnaughay for the research funds that have helped to support my research. Any mistakes are,
of course, my own. Portions of this article expand upon ideas presented in a prior blog posting
that can be found at: Nancy Welsh, Is The Supreme Court Demanding Enough As It Provides
Incentives For The PrivateFunding of a FederalSmall Claims Court?, SCOTUSblog (Sep. 21,
2011, 2:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/is-the-supreme-court-demanding-enoughas-it-provides-incentives-for-the-private-funding-of-a-federal-small-clains-court/.
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terms imposed by repeat players upon one-shot players (in the case of
mandatory predispute arbitration).
It is that last "alternative" process-mandatory predispute arbitrationthat has generated the most controversy because it appears beset with
structural bias. The recent cases of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion and
CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood have raised additional concerns as the
Supreme Court has announced that corporations can force consumers to
arbitrate their private and statutory claims and give up their rights to pursue
class relief. It is difficult to find a principled basis for the Court's
decisions.
This Article argues, however, that the Supreme Court's enthusiastic
embrace of mandatory predispute arbitration should be understood
primarily as institutional self-help, as an opportunistic search for the
funding and personnel that courts need to conduct fact-finding and
decision-making in cases that the courts perceive as routine. If Congress
and state legislatures will not provide such funding, perhaps corporations
will. By permitting corporations to impose class waivers on consumers, the
Supreme Court is incentivizing the corporations to provide and fund a
national private small claims court. If the Court is incentivizing in this way,
however, this Article urges that it should demand more in return for class
waiver. Specifically, it should demand evidence that the arbitration
procedure is sufficiently attractive to consumers so that they will pursue
their claims, as well as evidence that the procedure is sufficiently fair. One
difficulty in making these demands, however, is that courts are obligated to
use very limited grounds and a deferential standard of review for arbitral
awards.
Second, therefore, this Article urges courts to mine past experience in
other legal contexts that involve privatized judicial functions, a deferential
standard of judicial review and the incentivizing of procedural safeguards.
A previous article explored the possibility that judges could apply the
procedural due process jurisprudence-directly or indirectly-to mandatory
pre-dispute consumer arbitration to help ensure that individual arbitrators,
and the dispute resolution organizations that employ or contract with them,
will "hold the balance [sufficiently] nice, clear and true."' This Article
turns to the trust law and ERISA contexts for guidance.
Specifically, this Article looks to the Supreme Court case of
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn2 and its progeny to examine the
1.

See Nancy A.Welsh, Wh~at is "(Im)PartialEnough" in a World of Embedded Neutrals?,

52 ARiz. L. REv. 395, 443 (2010) (citing to Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) and
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009)).
2. 554 U.S. 105 (2008).
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evolution of the deferential standards of review that courts apply to ERISA
plan benefit denials by private claims administrators, particularly when
such administrators operate in a conflicted decision-making context. In this
context, the Supreme Court has managed to acknowledge the existence of
structural bias and make it a relevant and important factor to be considered
as part of deferential judicial review. Further, the Supreme Court has
provided guidance to lower courts regarding the weight to be given to
structural bias in this context and has provided examples of the information
required to assess such weight. Structural bias has been given the stature of
tiebreaker in close cases. Finally and most important for the purposes of
this Article, the Supreme Court has also incentivized the provision of
structural and procedural safeguards in order to reduce the potency of the
structural incentives that encourage biased decision-making. In other
words, the Supreme Court has incentivized the provision of safeguards that
will enhance the likelihood of accurate decision-making-all while
maintaining a deferential standard of review.
Corporations continue to experiment with mandatory predispute
arbitration clauses. The clause at issue in Concepcion, for example,
permitted consumers to bring their claims in small claims court rather than
arbitration and incorporated a monetary sanction if AT&T failed to make a
good faith settlement offer prior to arbitration. Are these sorts of
provisions, by themselves, sufficient to overcome the potential for structural
bias? Glenn provides a model for considering these provisions and their
sufficiency as procedural safeguards, even while retaining a deferential
standard of review. And importantly, in order to assess whether a clause
like the one at issue in Concepcion sufficiently reduced potential bias and
promoted accuracy, a court using Glenn's model likely would permit
discovery regarding the actual implementation of the clause's key
provisions. Glenn thus demonstrates the potential for incentivizing the
development of improved provisions.
I.

THE RECENT ARBITRATION JURISPRUDENCE OF CONCEPCION AND
COMPUCREDIT

The Supreme Court's most recent additions to its arbitration
jurisprudence involved strikingly small claims. 3 In AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion,4 decided in 2011, the Concepcions alleged that a cell phone
company had engaged in false advertising by describing a cell phone as free
3. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012); AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
4. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
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when, in fact, consumers would be required to pay state taxes.5 Those taxes
amounted to a mere $30.22.6 In CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood,
decided in 2012, the plaintiffs alleged that a credit repair organization had
similarly defrauded consumers when it advertised a credit card as available
at no cost and with an upfront credit line of $300 when, in fact, consumers
would be charged immediately with a finance fee, monthly fee and annual
fee. In Wanda Greenwood's case, these three fees added up to $257,9 thus
depriving her (and the other consumers with a weak credit rating to whom
this card was advertised) of all but $43 of the upfront credit line they
anticipated.1o

Cases with so little at stake hardly seem worthy of the attention of the
Supreme Court. But, of course, both Concepcion and CompuCredit
involved something more. The consumer contracts at issue in both cases
contained mandatory predispute arbitration clauses, each with a provocative
legal twist, and claims brought on behalf of a large class of consumers."
Small individual claims translate into astonishingly large stakes when
aggregated in this way. 12 In Concepcion, the arbitration clause in the
contract between AT&T and the Concepcions permitted the Concepcions to
bring their claims only on an individual basis, however, and then only in
arbitration or small claims court.13 Thus, the clause required these
consumers' waiver of their right to pursue redress through a class action. 14
The Supreme Court determined that the state law of unconscionability that
had been developed to bar such waiver was preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA").15
The contract between CompuCredit and Ms. Greenwood similarly
involved both an arbitration clause and class action, but the question at
issue was whether the federal Credit Repair Organizations Act

5. Id. at 1744.
6. Id.
7. CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665 (2012).
8. Id. at 676 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
9. Id
10. It must be acknowledged, of course, that these consumers were left with a credit line of
$43 when they likely had little to no credit available to them before they contracted with
CompuCredit. Id. at 676-77.
11. See id at 668; Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744-45.
12. See CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. 665; Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740.
13. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
14. Id. at 1744-45.
15. Id. at 1746, 1753.
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("CROA")-and, specifically, the provision 6 in CompuCredit's contract
that Ms. Greenwood had the "right to sue" under the CROA-limited the
credit company's ability to establish arbitration as the exclusive forum in
which a consumer could "sue." 1 Writing the majority opinion, Justice
Scalia asserted that most consumers would understand this "colloquial"
language as providing them with the "legal right, enforceable in court, to
recover damages from credit repair organizations that violate the CROA" 8
and, further, that their understanding would be "without regard to whether
the suit in court has to be preceded by an arbitration proceeding[.]"' 9 On
this basis, the Supreme Court concluded that consumers' right to access
public courts could and should then be limited to "judicial action
compelling or reviewing initial arbitral adjudication., 20 These empiricallyunsupported assertions regarding consumers' understanding of the sequence
of legal procedures to be used to implement the protections of the CROA,
combined with the statute's failure to include an explicit bar on the use of
arbitration,2' paved the way for the Supreme Court's decision that the FAA
required the enforcement of the terms of the arbitration clause at issue. 22
Concepcion in particular was followed by a flood of commentary 23 and
cases. 2 4 Professor Jean Sternlight recently provided a helpful survey of case

16. Importantly, this provision was included because it was a mandatory disclosure under the
CROA.
17. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 668-71.
18. Id. at 672 (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 671; Professors Marc Galanter and John Lande have observed that "virtually all
private courts' contain significant public elements" such as a reliance on public courts for
enforcement of private awards. Marc Galanter & John Lande, Private Courts and Public
Authority, 12 STUD. INLAW, POL. & SOC'Y 393, 394 (1992).
21. The Supreme Court has emphasized the need to look to a federal statute's text or
legislative history to determine whether arbitration is permitted. See, e.g., CompuCredit, 132 S.
Ct. at 675 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("As the majority opinion notes, the disclosure provision
does not itself confer a cause of action, and the liability provision that does is materially
indistinguishable from other statutes that we have held not to preclude arbitration. In my mind this
leaves the parties' arguments in equipoise, and our precedents require that petitioners prevail in
this circumstance. This is because respondents, as the opponents of arbitration, bear the burden of
showing that Congress disallowed arbitration of their claims, and because we resolve doubts in
favor of arbitration."); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(discussing need to look to federal statute to determine whether arbitration is permitted);
Shearson/Am. Exp., Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
22. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 673.
23. Interestingly, some of this commentary has tried to place Concepcion in perspective, in a
manner that establishes Concepcion as part of a core "trilogy" for arbitration jurisprudence in
much the same way that Celotex, Liberty Lobby and Matsushita have been described as summary
judgment's core "trilogy." See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, The Third Arbitration Trilogy: StoltNielsen, Rent-A-Center, Concepcion and the Future ofAmerican Arbitration, 22 AN. REv. INT'L
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law following Concepcion to urge that the decision represents a
"tsunami ... wiping out existing and potential consumer and employment
class actions." 2 5 She concludes that Concepcion has so dramatically
reduced corporations' assessment of the risk of litigation over the
enforcement of arbitration clauses that many more corporations will be
compelled to "impose arbitral class action waivers as a means to insulate
themselves from class actions[.]" 2 6 Her prescience may be evidenced by
Microsoft's announcement during the summer that it will include an
27
arbitration provision and class action waiver in many of its contracts,
although there are also a few courts that are stepping forward to strike down
class waivers. 28 Both Concepcion and CompuCredit fit neatly into a larger
picture of a Supreme Court that perceives mammoth class actions, and
many individual civil rights lawsuits, as generating unproductive income
for plaintiffs' and defense lawyers and needlessly disrupting the work of
embattled government and business leaders,29 when our nation needs such
leaders to focus their time and resources on re-energizing our economy and
protecting us from potential security threats.30 In this picture, corporations

ARB. 323, 325 (2011); Judith Resnik, Comment, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v.
Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 80-81 (2011).
24. See, e.g., Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 2011);
Kaltwasser v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 812 F.Supp. 2d 1042,1044 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
25. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to
Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012).
26. Id at 718. See also Nancy A. Welsh, I Could Have Been a Contender: Summary Jury
Trial as a Means to Overcome lqbal's Negative Effects upon Pre-Litigation Communication,
Negotiation, and Early Consensual Dispute Resolution, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1149, 1156-57

(2010) (making a similar prediction that the Supreme Court's decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) so dramatically reduce
the risk of undergoing litigation and responses to discovery that companies will stop providing inhouse conflict management systems).
27.

See David Lazarus, Microsoft to ProhibitClass Action Suits, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2012,

at B I.
28. See In re Am. Exp. Merchants' Litig., 667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted,
Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, No. 12-133, 2012 WL 3096737 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012); In
re Elec. Books Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2293 (DLC), 2012 WL 2478462, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June
27, 2012).
29.

See Welsh, I CouldHave Been a Contender,supra note 26, at 1156.

30.

See id. at 1184-85 (examining Justice Souter's majority opinion in Twombly and Justice

Kennedy's opinion in Iqbal); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Why Heightened Pleading-Why Now?, 114

PENN. ST. L. REV. 1247, 1252-53 (2010) (understanding Iqbal as a signal of deference to national
institutions); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why Hasn't the World Gotten to Yes? An
Appreciation and Some Reflections, 22 NEGOT. J. 485, 498 (2006) ("Does the larger zeitgeist in

which we live (Cold War, economic boom and bust, globalization, the War on Terror) affect how
we conceptualize the world and what we do? Is Getting to Yes and its progeny a product of its
time or a more universal expression of what might be possible, of what might be achieved?").
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and the Court are merely making opportunistic use of arbitration and the
FAA's protective shield, to camouflage the "troll" of class waiver.3 1
But there is another way to understand Concepcion and CompuCredit.
This view has much less to do with solicitousness toward corporations,
governmental institutions and authority3 2 and much more to do with the
federal judiciary's status as the "weakest" and "least dangerous" 33 of the
three branches of government.
II.

INCENTIVIZING CORPORATE FUNDING OF A PRIVATIZED SMALL
CLAIMS COURT

Both Concepcion and CompuCredithave the potential to be understood
as the Supreme Court's self-help answer to a Congress and state legislatures
that continue to funnel more civil and criminal cases to the courts 34 and
require annual reports regarding the efficiency of the courts' docket
management3 s while simultaneously underfunding and understaffing
them. 3 6 The Supreme Court has engaged in such self-help before. Long
ago, the institution slowed the pace of its decisions when Congress required
Supreme Court justices to resume riding circuit without a corresponding
31. Arbitration was not designed for this purpose. It is a valuable process that was developed
to meet the real needs of contracting parties. See Nancy A.Welsh, What is "(Im)PartialEnough "
in a World ofEmbedded Neutrals?, 52 ARIZ. L. REv. 395, 467 (2010). It is tempting to reimagine
arbitration as the rich but unpopular girl who is invited to the prom by the popular boy. She may
be dazzled by the invitation and even imagine that the boy actually likes her. Actually, he is just
using her to gain access to her car, her house, her pool, etc. See also JOHN STEINBECK, The
Chrysanthemums, in THE LONG VALLEY 1 (Penguin Books 1995) (1938).

32.

See Rachlinski, supra note 30, at 1252-54.

33.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 450 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n ed., 2009).

Hamilton argues that the judicial branch is undoubtedly the weakest of the three branches because
it lacks the ability to "attack" the other branches, and has little ability to defend itself if the
legislative or executive branch attempts to usurp those powers vested in the judicial branch.
34. See, e.g., Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1169 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying
defendant's motion to compel arbitration in response to plaintiff's action for violation of state and
federal civil rights); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1450 (2006);
Individuals with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12300 (2006); Federal Question
Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (removing the amount
in controversy requirement for federal question jurisdiction).
35.

See,

e.g.,

FED.

JUDICIAL

CTR.,

ANNUAL

REPORT

(2011),

available at

http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdfnsf/lookup/AnnRepll .pdf/$file/AnnRepll.pdf; Chief Justice John
G. Roberts, Jr., 2011 Year-End Report on the FederalJudiciary,THE THIRD BRANCH (Jan. 2012),

http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/12-01-01/2011_Year-EndReport
Federal Judiciary.aspx.

on the

36. See Judith Resnik, MediatingPreferences: LitigantPreferencesfor Process andJudicial
Preferencesfor Settlement, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 155, 162-63, 165 (2002); Judith Resnik, Trial as
Error,Jurisdictionas Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924,

998, 1011 (2000).
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pay increase.3 7 More recently, some have argued that the federal courts
have engaged in self-help as they have ordered parties to participate in
mediation and other settlement-oriented processes-and have also ordered
the parties to pay for the services of these mediators, special masters and
other neutrals.38
With Concepcion, CompuCredit and other recent arbitration cases
involving disparate parties,39 however, the Supreme Court is effectively
incentivizing the development of a new sort of layer of adjunct judicial
officers. 4 0 More specifically, the Court seems to be using the incentive of
class waiver to persuade corporations to fund a privatized national small
claims court that can then handle the many routine consumer-related
disputes that arise.4 1 Potentially, such a private court could mimic the
37. See James E. Pfander, JudicialCompensation and the Definition ofJudicialPowerin the
Early Republic, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2008).
38. See Deborah Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement Is Reshaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REv. 165, 195 (2003); Nancy A.
Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5 No. 2

CARDOZO J. CONFLICT. RESOL. 117 (2004). It is important to recall, however, that Congress
requiredthe federal courts to institutionalize mediation and other dispute resolution procedures in
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990. See 28 U.S.C. § 471-82 (2006).
39. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration, 10

CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 398 (2009) (referring to arbitration agreements involving
consumers and non-unionized employees as "disparate-party" arbitration); Theodore Eisenberg et
al., Arbitration's Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study ofArbitration Clauses in Consumer and

Non-Consumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 871, 895 (2008) (reporting empirical
findings that corporations are much more likely to insert arbitration clauses in contracts with
consumers and employees than in contracts with other corporations).
40. In response to a Congressional mandate, the federal district and circuit courts have
overtly established a layer of adjunct, privatized settlement facilitators-i.e., mediators on court
rosters or selected independently by the parties. See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 28 U.S.C.

§ 652(a) (2006). Interestingly, in this context, courts have not incentivized parties' use and
funding of mediation. Rather, courts have mandated such use of mediation and other "nonbinding" dispute resolution processes. Districts also may mandate payment of the mediators. See
Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-ConnectedMediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 137-39 (2004). See also Nancy A. Welsh and Andrea K.
Schneider, The Thoughtful Integrationof Mediation into Investment Treaty Arbitration, _ HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. _ (describing variations of "mandatory" mediation in the U.S., as well as
incentives provided elsewhere) (forthcoming).
41. One irony is that while the Supreme Court is thus seeking to "outsource" small claims,
various states have established new business courts designed to woo corporations and their
commercial jurisprudence back into the public courts. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Business
Courts and the Future of Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 491, 506-07 (2009)
(describing business courts and finding no evidence that such courts are taking commercial
business from arbitration); John Coyle, Business Courts and Interstate Competition, 53 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1915, 1919-20 (2012). Meanwhile, some well-respected business courts have
begun to offer for-fee arbitration services themselves, with the blessing of their legislatures. See,
e.g., Gregory P. Williams et al., Securities Litigation: Arbitration in the Delaware Court of
Chancery, 25 INSIGHTS: THE CORPORATE & SECURITIES LAw ADVISOR 2 (July 2011). But see
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expedited procedures and in-person nature of the small claims courtS42
found in public courthouses and office buildings around the country.43
More likely, a private court of this sort would adapt the settlement-focused
approaches used in well-run corporate customer service and compliance
departments" and take advantage of technological platforms that enhance
efficiency and overcome geographic limitations-e.g., online procedures, 45
telephonic 46 or video conferenced 47 hearings, procedures based exclusively
on paper submissions, 4 etc. 4 9
It would not be illogical to conclude that expensive, procedure-laden
public courts are not needed to process routine consumer matters.
Research, after all, shows that creditors' debt collection claims, not
consumer-initiated claims, dominate the dockets of small claims courts and

Delaware Coalition for Open Government v. Strine, No. 1:11-1015, 2012 WL 3744718 (D.Del.
Aug. 30, 2012).
42. See, e.g., Bruce Zucker & Monica Her, The People's Court Examined: A Legal and
EmpiricalAnalysis of the Small Claims Court System, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 315, 317 (2003). Also

referred to as conciliation courts, small claims part courts, commercial small claims courts, minor
courts and municipal courts. See, e.g., RALPH WARNER, EVERYBODY'S GUIDE TO SMALL CLAIMS

COURT (14th ed. 2012).
43. Small-claims courts are often caricatured on television programs such as Judge Judy. See
Zucker & Her, supra note 42, at 322-23. In actuality, Judge Judy offers a form of arbitration. See
Joshua S. Wilson & Erin Ackerman, "Tort Tales" and TV Judges: Amplifying, Modifying, or
Counteringthe Antitort Narrative?,46 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 105, 112 (2012).
44. See Dusty Bates Farned, A New Automated Class of Online Dispute Resolution:
Changing the Meaning of Computer Mediated Communication, 2 FAULKNER L. REV. 335 (2011);
Colin Rule and Chittu Nagarjan, Leveraging the Wisdom of Crowds: The eBay Community Court
and the Future of Online Dispute Resolution, AC RESOLUTION (Winter 2010).
45. Louis Del Duca et al., Facilitating Expansion of Cross-Border E-Commerce Developing a Global Online Dispute Resolution System (Lessons Derived from Existing ODR
Systems - Work of the UnitedNations Commission on InternationalTrade Law), 1 PENN. ST. J.L.
& INT'L AFF. 59 (2012); M. Ethan Katsh, Dispute Resolution in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV.
953 (1996); Orna Rabinovich-Einy, Technology's Impact: The Quest for a New Paradigmfor
Accountability in Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 253 (2006); Orna Rabinovich-Einy &
Ethan Katsh, Technology and the Future of Dispute Systems Design, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
151, 164-193 (2012); Colin Rule et al., Designinga Global Consumer Online Dispute Resolution
(ODR) System for Cross-Border Small Value-High Volume Claims-OAS Developments, 42 UCC
L.J. 221 (2010); Amy Schmitz, "Drive-Thru" Arbitration in the Digital Age: Empowering
Consumers ThroughBinding ODR, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 178 (2010).

46. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 45, at 195 n.110.
47. See id at 186.
48. See id at 209 n. 192; Mark Spottswood, Live Hearingsand Paper Trials, 38 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 827, 829 (2011).
49. It is difficult to avoid noticing a similar enthusiasm among public universities for online

delivery of educational services, which has achieved significant success in the private sector.
Richard Pdrez-Pefia, Ousted Head of University is Reinstated in Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
2012, at Al3.
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private consumer arbitration50 (and, presumably, the income received by
both types of tribunals in filing fees).
In a majority of these cases,
whether they are arbitrated or litigated, consumers owe the monies claimed
and either default5 2 or lose on the merits.53 As state and federal courts face
severe budget cuts, why not allow the affected corporations to elect and
pay5 4 for alternative, more efficient private tribunals to handle such routine
matters, with such predicable dynamics and results? 55
The answer to this question is relatively straightforward. Such a
transformation inevitably triggers serious constitutional concerns regarding
the fundamental right of access to, and protections afforded by, our public

50. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration FairnessAct and
the Supreme Court's Recent ArbitrationJurisprudence,48 HOUS. L. REv. 457 (2011); Christopher
R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in Arbitration and in Court, 7 HASTINGS Bus.

L.J. 77, 77 n.l (2011); Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 25, at 723-24 (referencing research
regarding the consumers' initiation of arbitration proceedings against AT&T Mobility and First
USA); see also Thomas J. Stipanowich, Nancy Welsh, Lisa Blomgren Bingham & Larry Mills,
National Roundtable on Consumer and Employment Dispute Resolution: Consumer Arbitration
Roundtable Summary Report, PENN STATE LAW RES. PAPER No. 18-2012, APRIL 17, 2012, at 7.
51. But see, e.g., Ethan Bronner, Poor Land in Jail as Companies Add Huge Fees for

Probation, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2012, at Al (describing how the courts and companies are
requiring significant payments from the poor); JAMES
PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE

Q. WHITMAN,

HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL

BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 97-98

(2003)

(surveying the history of the treatment of high-status prisoners in France and Germany).
52. See FTC, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT
COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 41-44 (2010) (reporting incidence of default and

problems with provision of notice to consumers); Cole, Babies and Bathwater, supra note 50, at
472 n.50.
53. See, e.g., Cole, Babies and Bathwater, supra note 50, at 472 n.50; Sarah R. Cole and &
Kristen M. Blankley, EmpiricalResearch on Consumer Arbitration: What the Data Reveals, 113

PENN ST. L. REV. 1051 (2009).
54. There is some indication, however, that corporations are reducing this financial
obligation by imposing fee-shifting upon consumers who lose in arbitration. See Miles B. Farmer,
Mandatory and Fair?A Better System of Mandatory Arbitration, 121 YALE L.J. 2346, 2355-56
(2012) (citing Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration:Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV.

1631, 1649-50 (2005)). Others have noted that in this and other ways, the U.S. common law and
adversarial approach to litigation seems to give way to an approach that is mimicking the
Continental civil law inquisitorial approach (involving less discovery and greater incidence of feeshifting). See Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements, Nontrial
Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of FederalCivil Cases, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 733 (2004); James R. Maxeiner, Pleading and Access to Civil
Procedure:Historical and Comparative Reflections on lqbal, a Day in Court and a Decision

According to Law, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1257, 1259 (2010).
55.

See Maurits Barendrecht, Courts, Competition and Innovation, TILBURG LAW SCH.

LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES No. 003/2012, Sept. 27, 2011, at 11-12 (listing areas for
improvement by courts that invite litigants to shop for other, more innovative forums). But see
Drahozal, supra note 41, at 506-07 (finding little evidence that the innovation of business courts is
luring litigants away from arbitration).
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courts.56 The vast majority of citizens and residents in the U.S., after all,
are likely to be involved in only "small claims,"5 resort to our public courts
only infrequently,58 and need the procedural protections promised by the
courts (even though the courts regularly fail, as do all creations of man, to
deliver on their promises). 59 Authorizing corporations to shape and fund a
national small claims court through which consumers must navigate before
they may access public courts, and then limiting such access to deferential
judicial review, invites both the perception and the reality of a system that
is beset by structural bias. Such perceptions then endanger the public's
perception of the courts as a place where they can trust that they will
experience justice.o
56.

See, e.g., U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973);

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-76 (1971); Wilcox Elec., Inc. v. F.A.A., 119 F.3d 724,
726-28 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the court could not review an agency award because the
appellant lacked Article III standing).
57. See Warner, supra note 42. Further, as noted by Professor Stemlight, many consumers
are unaware of these claims and are unlikely to bring an action, except as part of a class action.
See Sternlight, Tsunami, supra note 25, at 722-23.

58. Of course, I am distinguishing here between repeat players (e.g., lawyers, insurers,
certain corporations) and one-shot players (e.g., most individuals in the U.S.). Research has
shown that most people, most of whom are one-shot players, are likely to take very few of their
disputes to court for redress. See Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World ofExpanding Social

Capability,37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 115, 117-18 (2010) ("The central intellectual construct of the
dispute perspective was the dispute pyramid-the notion that any sector of the legal world can be
envisioned as a pyramid in which a base of troubles or injuries underlies a layer of perceived
injuries, which leads in turn to successively smaller layers of grievances (injuries for which some
human actor is viewed as responsible), claims, and disputes."); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves"
Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits ofLegal Change, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 96, 97-100
(1974) (noting the significant advantages that repeat players have over one-shot players); Leonard
L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is?: "The Problem" in Court-OrientedMediation,
15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 925-26 (2008) (describing civil litigation as a "once-in-a-lifetime"
event for most people, who are thus one-shot players).
59. See Phyllis E. Bernard, Minorities,Mediation and Method: The View from One CourtConnected Mediation Program, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 7, 36 (2008); Peter A. Holland, The
One Hundred Billion Dollar Problem in Small Claims Court: Robo-Signing and Lack of Proof in
Debt Buyer Cases, 6 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 259, 265-66, 266 n.42 (2011) (discussing cases arising out
of the foreclosure crisis and the processing of foreclosures even when paperwork was missing).
60. I have written elsewhere about the negative effect that structural bias almost certainly
will have upon perceptions of procedural justice, particularly if parties are given no meaningful
ability to avoid such bias. See Welsh, Embedded Neutrals, supra note 31 at 424-26; see also
Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants
About the Place, Value and Meaning of Mediation, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 573, 648-50,
659-61 (reporting structural choices and mediator behaviors in special education mediation that
led to perceptions of bias); Nancy Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S
FIELDBOOK 165, 171 (Andrea K. Schneider & Christopher Honeyman, eds., 2006); Nancy Welsh,
The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. OF
CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 131 (2004) (regarding structural bias). Perceptions of procedural justice
matter. They influence perceptions of substantive justice, compliance with outcomes, and
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Further, if the Supreme Court's support for mandatory predispute
disparate party arbitration and its accompanying opposition to consumers'
class proceedings are indeed motivated by the justices' desire to establish a
new layer of inferior, adjunct judicial officers, the use of arbitration
jurisprudence as a backdoor funding mechanism raises many vexing
questions. Some of these questions involve limits that the Constitution
places upon the Court's institutional authority.6 1 Such questions are
deserving of searching academic and legal attention.
This Article, however, will accept the premise that legislative
encouragement of private attorneys general through plaintiff-friendly fee-

perceptions of the legitimacy of the institutions that provide dispute resolution and decisionmaking procedures. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988); E. Allan Lind, ProceduralJustice, Disputing, and Reactions to
Legal Authorities, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 177 (Austin Sarat, et al. eds.,
1998); Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure,35 INT'L. J. PSYCHOL. 117 (2000);
see also Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into
Investment Treaty Arbitration,
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. _ (describing procedural justice

literature, considering its relationship to dispute system design and applying it to the integration of
mediation into investor-state dispute resolution) (forthcoming); Nancy A. Welsh, Donna Stienstra
& Bobbi McAdoo, The Application of ProceduralJustice Research to Judicial Actions and
Techniques in Settlement Sessions, in THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski, eds.) (forthcoming 2013); Barbara
McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons from the
Institutionalizationof Court-ConnectedMediation, 5 NEV. L. J. 399, 402 (describing generally the

1976 Pound Conference and three ABA presidents' defense of the courts as a place where people
could get justice unavailable elsewhere); Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected
Mediation: What's Justice Got To Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 859-61 (2001); Nancy A.
Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-ConnectedMediation: A Hollow Promise Without
ProceduralJustice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179 (2002).

61.

The Supreme Court certainly has the authority to interpret the jurisdiction of the federal

district courts narrowly and wait for Congressional response-or acquiescence. See, e.g.,
Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1331

to require the federal district courts' original jurisdiction to be pled in the complaint). See also
Peter B. Rutledge, Arbitration and Article III, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1189, 1201 (2008) ("By

mandating the enforcement of the award and controlling the scope of Article III review,
particularly the extent of review of the merits of federal questions, Congress effectively is
stripping federal courts of the power to interpret the meaning of federal law and erecting a system
by which others, namely arbitrators, can define it. It also effectively is mandating that federal
courts treat the result of this private dispute resolution system as a judgment of a federal court,
with all of the accoutrements that accompany that judgment."). Even if the Supreme Court can
thus engage in de facto federal jurisdiction stripping, what is the source of its authority for
depriving state courts of their jurisdiction? Will the procedural protections of the Due Process
Clause apply to a private court encouraged by the Supreme Court and funded in this manner? See
Welsh, Embedded Neutrals, supra note 31; Richard C. Reuben, ConstitutionalGravity:A Unitary
Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REv. 949 (2000);
Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem ofArbitration, 67 LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS. 279 (2004).
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shifting62 and class actions 63 is coming to a close-and is being replaced
with judicial encouragement of, and apparent legislative acquiescence in,
the creation of a privately-funded national small claims tribunal. What
then?
III. INCENTIVIZING PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS

Concepcion and CompuCredit have created the conditions that now
require courts to either find non-discriminatory6 bases for rejecting class
waivers in the arbitration clauses65 in consumer contracts or counterbalance
the rise of this new, privately-funded small claims court with equally-new
procedural and structural safeguards. This Article will focus on the latter
task. Such safeguards could be designed to enhance the likelihood of
sufficient fairness during the fact-finding process-or at least reduce the
likelihood of unfairness and biased decision-making.
Importantly, work has already been done to develop such safeguards in
the form of protocols and policies. 6 Some of the most respected dispute
62. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(3)
(providing for one-way fee shifting in "family leave" cases); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(k) (2006); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006); Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006); see also Judith Resnik, Money Matters
148 U. PA. L. REv. 2119 (2000).
63. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. It must be noted that Congress has also acted to limit such
availability. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Private Securities Litigation and Reform Act of
1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 373 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
64. See Hiro Aragaki, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the Antidiscrimination Theory of
Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 4 Y.B. ARB. & MED. 2012 (2012), available at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2046453;
for Arbitration, 58 UCLA L. REv. 1189,1192-94 (2011).
65.

Hiro Aragaki, Equal Opportunity

See In re Am. Exp. Merchants' Litig., 667 F.3d at 219; Elec. Books, 2012 WL 2478462,

at *3.
66. The American Arbitration Association's administration of consumer arbitration is guided
by the Consumer Due Process Protocol and the AAA's Consumer Rules Supplement. See
National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee, Consumer Due Process Protocol (1997),
available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22019; National Task Force on the Arbitration of
Consumer Debt Collection Disputes, Consumer Debt Collection Due Process Protocol Statement
of Principles (2010), available at http://www.adr.org/si.asp?id=6248. JAMS, meanwhile, has
developed its own policy for consumer arbitration. See JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations
Pursuant to Pre-Dispute Clauses: Minimum Standards of Procedural Fairness (2009), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-Rules/JAMSConsumer_MinStds2009.pdf. See also Stipanowich et al., National Roundtable supra note 50 at 48-52 (describing
several consumer dispute resolution programs and models); Amy J. Schmitz, Curing Consumers'
Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISPUTE RESOL. 627 (2008);
Amy J. Schmitz, Legislating in the Light: Considering Empirical Data in Crafting Arbitration
Reforms, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 115 (2010).
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resolution providers abide by such protocols and policies. 67 Although there
are meaningful differences among them, 6 8 there are also many
commonalities in terms of their commitment to providing consumers with a
neutral and convenient forum, access to information, and services at a
reasonable cost. Some of these providers also have established special rules
for class action arbitration. Indeed, at one point JAMS determined that it
would not administer arbitration clauses containing class waivers. In the
face of very negative reactions, however, JAMS revised its policy and will
now administer such clauses.o
There is no guarantee that all arbitral providers will adopt procedural
safeguards. Many of the terms are likely to reduce efficiency, at least on a
short-term basis, and the story of JAMS' brief flirtation with refusing to
enforce class waivers hints at the potential consequences that arbitral
providers may suffer if they stand alone in taking a position that is
unpopular with those choosing which arbitral providers to include in their
boilerplate contracts. Essential procedural safeguards are much more likely
71
to be adopted if courts establish incentives to encourage such behavior.

67. See supra note 66; see also CPR-Georgetown Commission on Ethics and Standards of
Practice in ADR, Principles for ADR Provider Organizations (2002), available at
http://www.cpradr.org/Resources/ALLCPRArticles/tabid/265/ID/623/Principles-for-ADRProvider-Organizations.aspx.
68. For example, Principle 5 of the Consumer Due Process Protocols used by the American
Arbitration Association provides that consumer ADR agreements should permit consumers to seek
relief in small claims court. JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitrations, in contrast, does not provide
for access to small claims court. See id. The Due Process Protocol and JAMS Policy on
Consumer Arbitrations also vary in their assurance that consumers will have access in arbitration
to all otherwise-available remedies. The Due Process Protocols provide that the arbitrator should
be empowered to grant whatever relief would be available in court under law or in equity; the
JAMS Policy on Consumer Arbitration does not provide for all such remedies if the consumer is
permitted to pursue otherwise-unavailable remedies in court. Compare Principle 14 of the Due
Process Protocols, supra note 66, with Standard 3 of the JAMS Policy, supra note 66.
69. See,
e.g.,
JAMS
Class
Action
Procedures
(2009),
available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-class-action-procedures/; AAA's Supplementary Rules for Class
Actions (2003), available at http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/rules/searchrules/rulesdetail?doc=
ADRSTG_004129& afrLoop=756271851123260& afrWindowMode=0& afrWindowld=1dph8i
v9dz_ 193#%40%3F afrWindowld%3DIdph8iv9dz 193%26 afrLoop%3D756271851123260%2
6doc%3DADRSTG_004129%26_afrWindowMode%3DO%26_adf.ctrl-state%3DIdph8iv9dz_
218.
70. See Martin H. Malin, The Arbitration FairnessAct: An Idea That's Time Has Come?, 87
IND. L. J. 289, 312 (2012); JAMS Revises Procedures on Class Arbitration, CLASS ACTION

NEWSLETTER (Schiff Hardin, L.L.P.), June 25, 2009; Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Is
JAMS in a Jam Over Its Policy Regarding Class Action Waivers in Consumer Arbitration
Agreements?, 61 BUSINESS LAWYER 923 (2006).

71. See also, Farmer, supra note 54, at 2349 (proposing that "in addition to the threat of
prosecution [by public attorneys], incentives and mechanisms should be created for arbitration
providers and parties who use mandatory arbitration to make their systems of dispute resolution
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At this point, then, it is worth returning to the arbitration provision that
was at issue in Concepcion. To begin, it is more accurate to describe this
clause as a two-step or tiered dispute resolution provision that is remarkably
similar to the provisions used to settle class actions in the past.72 Because
of the procedural safeguards it contained, the average consumer might have
To initiate a dispute proceeding, the
found this clause quite appealing.
consumer had only to complete a short online form on the AT&T website.74
AT&T could then offer to settle the claim. 7 5 Thus, both AT&T and the
consumer could avoid the cost and time involved in pursuing arbitration.
If AT&T did not make such an offer, or if the dispute was not resolved
within thirty days, the consumer could then file a separate demand for
arbitration, also through the website.7 6 The clause further provided that:
*
*
*

*

If the parties went to arbitration, AT&T had to pay all costs for
non-frivolous claims;77
The arbitration had to take place in the county in which the
customer was billed;7 8
For claims of $10,000 or less, the customer could choose the
form of the arbitration - in person, by telephone or based only
on paper submissions;79
Either the consumer or AT&T could bring a claim in small
claims court rather than arbitrate;8 0

fairer"); Thomas J. Stipanowich, The ArbitrationFairnessIndex: Using A Public Rating System to
Skirt the Legal Logjam and Promote Fairerand More Effective Arbitration of Employment and

Consumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985, 991 (2012) (proposing a privately-developed and
privately-administered rating system to incentivize procedural safeguards).
72. See Nancy Welsh & Judge Ann Montgomery, Grappling the Monster Case: The Next
Frontierin ADR, 54 BENCH & BAR OF MINNESOTA 21 (Sept. 2007); Francis E. McGovern, The
What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1361, 1368-70 (2005)

(describing procedures used to resolve mass torts and class actions); Francis H. McGovern,
Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871, 885 (2001)

(describing procedural options in A. H. Robins case); see also Peter Salem, The Emergence of
Triage in Family Court Services, the Beginning of the Endfor Mandatory Mediation, 47 FAM. CT.
REv. 371 (2009); Peter Salem et al., Triaging Court Services: The Connecticut JudicialBranch's
Family Civil Intake Screen, 27 PACE L. REV. 741, 749 (2006-2007).
73. See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 1744.
Id
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id
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The arbitrator was authorized to award any form of individual
relief (and as Justice Scalia's opinion noted, this presumably
included punitive damages);"
AT&T was not permitted to seek reimbursement from the
consumer for its attorney's fees; 82 and
In the event that the consumer received an arbitration award
greater than AT&T's last written settlement offer, AT&T was
then required to pay a $7,500 minimum recovery and twice the
amount of the consumer's attorney's fees."

All of these procedural specifics sound very good.84 It is worth noting,
however, that AT&T inserted some of the most appealing terms only after
the Concepcionsfiled their lawsuit.85 Apparently, the prospect of appearing
before a judge and receiving a legally binding ruling incentivized the
inclusion of these procedural specifics.86
The Ninth Circuit undertook some hard-headed risk analysis in
reviewing some of the other terms in the clause, ultimately concluding that
a consumer was terribly unlikely to receive the $7,500 premium payment.
If a consumer made a small claim in arbitration, for example, AT&T could
avoid paying the premium and the consumer's attorney's fees as long as it
paid the face value of the claim at any point before the selection of the
arbitrator.8 8 "Thus," according to the Ninth Circuit, "the maximum gain to
a customer for the hassle of arbitrating a $30.22 dispute is still just
$30.22."89
The Ninth Circuit's analysis is not illogical, though it does ignore
social science research showing that human beings are not entirely rational

8 1. Id.

82. Id.
83. Id.
84. There is room for debate, of course, on whether they are good enough, particularly in
terms of providing consumers with sufficient access to legal information, legal advice and legal
representation. See Tom Stipanowich et al., NationalRoundtable,supra note 50, at 22 (describing
concerns regarding consumers' access to legal advice and representation).
8 5. Id.
86. See Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cvl 167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at
* 11 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008), rev' sub nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct.
1740 (2011).
87. See Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855-56 (9th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub
nom. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
88. Laster v. AT&TMobility LLC, 584 F.3d at 855-56.
89. Id at 856.
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as they make decisions. People still gamble in casinos after all. 90 Indeed,
Justice Scalia's opinion clarifies that in Concepcion, a class proceeding was
not necessary because AT&T had fashioned a sufficiently attractive and just
bilateral proceeding as the substitute:
[T]he claim here was most unlikely to go unresolved. As noted earlier, the
arbitration agreement provides that AT&T will pay claimants a minimum
of $7,500 and twice their attorney's fees if they obtain an arbitration
award greater than AT&T's last settlement offer. The District Court found
this scheme sufficient to provide incentive for the individual prosecution
of meritorious claims that are not immediately settled, and the Ninth
Circuit admitted that aggrieved customers who filed claims would be
"essentially guarantee[d]" to be made whole . . . . Indeed, the District

Court concluded that the Concepcions were better off under their
arbitration agreement with AT&T than they would have been as
participants in a class action, which "could take months, if not years, and
which may merely yield an opportunity to submit a claim for recovery of a
small percentage of a few dollars." 91
Justice Scalia clearly acknowledges the importance of ensuring the
attractiveness of alternative procedures and the likelihood that individual
consumers will use them to effectuate their legal rights.92 Recent decisions
in the Second Circuit signal that some courts are hearing that message.9 3
It could very well be that AT&T's arbitration provision with its online
elements, premium payment and potential reimbursement of attorney's fees
would encourage consumers to make claims, thus benefitting themselves
and alerting AT&T to problem areas.94 If AT&T then attended to those
problem areas (perhaps with the help of an ombuds), 95 the clause could have

90. See Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory and
Practice, 21 OH1o ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 281, 290-94 (2006) (generally describing optimistic
overconfidence or overconfidence bias and applying it to mediation); Dan Simon, A Third View of
the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision-Making, 71 U. CHt. L. REv. 511, 586
(2004) ("[N]ovices and experts alike tend to distort the probability of winning toward optimistic
overconfidence").
91. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
92. See id at 1749.
93. See In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 667 F.3d at 219.
94. See Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 2008 WL 5216255, at *10-11.
95. If AT&T chose to institutionalize an ombudsperson in addition to arbitration, for
example, this neutral could collect data regarding arbitral claims and awards in order to make
corporate officers aware-quickly-of emerging problems in a particular location or with a
particular advertising campaign. The corporation could then take prompt corrective action, rather
than waiting until it receives a demand letter threatening a class action. If such an ombudsperson
is sufficiently independent and careful-and sufficiently supported by structural and procedural
safeguards-she has the potential to serve many of the same public interests served by a private
attorney general initiating, and a judge overseeing, a class action.
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the effect of encouraging responsive change and deterring bad conduct, thus
achieving some of the most important effects of class actions. Seen in this
light, granting class waiver could be quite reasonable. Rather than thinking
of AT&T as a company that required publicly-imposed coercive sanctions
to deter bad behavior, such a dispute resolution clause and voluntary
corrective action would signal a company that welcomes the opportunity to
learn about problems from its customers and improve its goods and
services. Such a customer-oriented approach may seem naYve, but it also
makes good business sense.
If the clause makes this much sense, it then becomes clear that neither
AT&T nor any other company should be allowed to demand class waiver as
the quid pro quo for the simple funding of a small claims court. Of course,
this is just the sort of demand that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
Wireless Association,97 DirecTV, Comcast and Dell9 8 made in their amicus
briefs to the Court. In Concepcion, the Supreme Court did not need to bow
before these threats. At the very least, it could have demanded more in
return for consumers' loss of their right to aggregate small claims,
especially when the potentially negative effects of such loss were to be
compounded by deferential judicial review. In particular, the Supreme
Court could have required that if a company seeks and wins a class waiver,
any proposed substitute process must be 1) sufficiently attractive to

96. The Chamber observed that "[b]usinesses will likely forego arbitration entirely before
they will choose to suffer class arbitration." Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. as
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740
(2011) (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3167313 at *12. The Chamber also pointed out, however, that
"what makes class arbitration truly intolerable to many businesses is the nature of the adverse
judgments it can produce. Like class litigation, class arbitration can cripple a business with a
gargantuan judgment. But unlike class litigation, where appellate review of a court's certification
and merits decisions is robust, the standard for vacating an arbitrator's decision is 'among the
narrowest known to law."' Id. at * 14.
97. The Wireless Association's members include all of the major domestic cell phone
providers. In its brief, the Association pointed out that businesses typically shoulder most of the
costs associated with arbitration, in part because the benefits of individual arbitration make such a
subsidization economically viable. If class procedures became allowable, regardless of the waiver
language, the Association argued that there would no longer be any rational business incentive to
subsidize the cost of arbitration. Brief of CTIA - The Wireless Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893),
2010 WL 3183858 at *21.
98. Among other points, DirecTV, Comcast and Dell observed that Comcast and Amazon
had decided to limit, or eliminate entirely, the use of consumer arbitration as a result of the
Discover Bank case in California and the Scott case in Washington. Brief ofAmici Curiae Directv,
Inc, 2010 WL 3183855, at *16. They also urged that if companies discontinued their use of
arbitration, consumers would be hurt due to increased prices. Id. at *19.
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encourage consumer complaints and the correction of problems, and 2)
sufficiently fair in terms of both process and outcome. 99
At one point in his opinion, though, Justice Scalia suggests that any old
rough justice will do in arbitration as long as the process is streamlined,
efficient, low cost and speedy.100 Indeed, he asserts that these are the
"fundamental attributes" of arbitration, and anything that interferes with
these attributes "creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA."o' Such
language has encouraged lower courts to interpret the "rules" apparently
emerging from Concepcion as strikingly broad-brush and patently
undemanding.10 2 One is that "[w]hen state law prohibits outright the
arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The
conflicting rule is displaced by the FAA." 0 3 A second is that "[s]tates
cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is
desirable for unrelated reasons."a Many overburdened state and federal
courts are using these sentences from Justice Scalia's opinion as they order
consumers and employees away from the courts and away from class
proceedings, into privatized bilateral arbitration.' 05
These courts are
ignoring Justice Scalia's acknowledgement of the specifics of AT&T's
clause.
Such easy and undemanding diversion from the courts cannot last. If
the Supreme Court is indeed providing an incentive for the private funding
of an expanding layer of judicial adjuncts to conduct initial fact-finding, it
will also inevitably be called upon to ensure that adjuncts' procedures meet
at least the essential requirements of procedural due process.10 6 Most
notable among these is a sufficiently impartial decision-maker and
process.107 Such expectations will then require enforcement by someone. os
99. See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 343 (1976) ("An additional factor to be
considered here is the fairness and reliability of the existing predetermination procedures, and the
probable value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards.").
100. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1749.
101.

Id. at 1748.

102. See Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Philadelphia, Inc., 673 F.3d 221, 232-33 (3d Cir.
2012); Litman v. Cellco P'ship, 655 F.3d 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2011).
103. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1747; Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass'n, 673 F.3d 947, 957, 960
(9th Cir. 2012).
104. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753; In reAm. Express Merchs.'Litig., 667 F.3d at 213.
105. See Quillion, 673 F.3d at 232-33, 237.
106. Reuben, ConstitutionalGravity, supra note 61 at 987-88. See also Welsh, Embedded
Neutrals, supra note 31 at 407.
107. See Reuben, Constitutional Gravity, supra note 61 at 987-88; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 271 (1970) ("And, of course, an impartial decision maker is essential.").
108.

See John Lande, Shifting the Focusfrom the Myth of "The Vanishing Trial" to Complex

Conflict Management Systems, or I LearnedAlmost Everything I Need to Know About Conflict
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If, as the Supreme Court states in CompuCredit,the courts will be available
to play this role only when and if consumers and other one-shot players
choose to fight the enforcement of arbitral awards,' 0 9 the rigor of judicial
review will become ever more important. Jurisprudence under the FAA,
however, presents some unique challenges to achieving such rigor.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
The FAA provides for very limited grounds for the vacatur of arbitral
awards and the standard for judicial review of arbitral awards is very
deferential." 0 Indeed, under the FAA, judges often must be more
deferential to arbitrators than to other judges. Structural bias certainly is
not listed as one of the grounds for vacatur.1 The ground for vacatur of
arbitral awards that is closest to structural bias is "evident partiality," and
courts have been very reluctant to find that structural bias meets the
requirements of evident partiality." 2 They have refused, for example, to
vacate awards even when the arbitrator has been the employee of one of the
parties," 3 or when one of the parties has been represented on the governing
board of the trade association that conducted the arbitration.11 4 With
Resolution from Marc Galanter,6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 191, 203, 206 (2005); Reuben,
Constitutional Gravity, supra note 61, at 976-77; Sarah Rudolph Cole, Fairness in Securities
Arbitration:A ConstitutionalMandate?, 26 PACE L. REV. 73, 75 (2005-2006).
109. CompuCredit, 132 S. Ct. at 671.
110. See Welsh, Embedded Neutrals,supranote 31, at 417.
111. See id at 404-05.
112. See id. at 417, 417 n. 133, 470 n. 458. For several years, courts have used the state law
of unconscionability to refuse to enforce mandatory predispute arbitration clauses.
In
Concepcion, however, the Supreme Court found evidence of judicial hostility to arbitration in
California courts' alleged tendency to be more likely to find contacts to arbitrate unconscionable
than other contracts. Concepcion at 1747 (citing Broome, An Unconscionable Applicable of the
Unconscionability Doctrine: How the California Courts are Circumventing the Federal
Arbitration Act, 3 HASTINGS Bus. L.J. 39, 54, 66 (2006); Susan Randall, Judicial Attitudes
Toward Arbitrationand the Resurgence of Unconscionability, 52 BUFFALO L.REv. 185, 186-187
(2004)); see generally Hiro N. Aragaki, AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and the
Antidiscrimination Theory of FederalArbitration Act Preemption, 4 Y.B. Arb. & Med. 2012
(2012), availableat http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2046453.
113. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 623 N.E.2d 531, 533-34.
114. In Harterv. Iowa Grain Co., 220 F.3d 544 (7th Cir. 2000), the parties to the arbitration
were a corporation and a farmer. They arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration provision in a hedgeto-arrive (HTA) contract. The corporation was a member of the trade association designated to
provide arbitration. One of the corporation's top employees sat on the trade association's board
and the corporation paid more than $26,000 annually in dues to the association. The trade
association had taken the public position that the HTA contract did not represent a futures
contract, which was an issue in the case. A significant portion of the association's members had
written HTA contracts. The arbitral panel placed limits on the parties' ability to conduct
discovery and eventually awarded attorneys' fees to the corporation without reviewing actual
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Concepcion and CompuCredit as the latest examples of the Supreme
Court's intention to enforce the very arbitration clauses that other courts
have found to be unconscionable or inconsistent with the substantive rights
granted by federal statutes, the current deferential standard for the review of
arbitral awards becomes ever more problematic.115
Indeed, judicial
deference to arbitrators and the outcomes they produce becomes especially
worrisome when arbitration draws its efficacy from the enforcement power
of the state and the arbitrators' and arbitral organization's role is due to
their special relationship with just one of the parties, usually the more
powerful repeat player, in uneven contests between that repeat player and a
one-time player."'6 As I have written before:
This concern is especially strong when the one-time player is not as
sophisticated as the repeat player, has not voluntarily or knowingly chosen
the dispute resolution forum that will be used to resolve her dispute, and is
either unaware of the special relationship between the neutral and the
repeat player or aware of the relationship but effectively unable to
challenge it.11 7
Some commentators have already begun to urge more rigorous judicial
review in the disparate party context' in light of the appropriateness and
advantages of such rigor. ' Professor Sarah Cole has proposed that courts
billing records. Furthermore, the arbitral panel's decision was subject to review by the
association's national secretary.
115. See Welsh, Embedded Neutrals,supra note 31, at 404-05.
116. See Nancy Welsh, Is The Supreme Court Demanding Enough As It Provides Incentives
For The Private Funding of a Federal Small Claims Court?, SCOTUSblog (Sep. 21, 2011, 2:13
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/is-the-supreme-court-demanding-enough-as-itprovides-incentives-for-the-private-funding-of-a-federal-small-claims-court/; Welsh, Embedded
Neutrals, supra note 31.
117. Welsh, Embedded Neutrals, supra note 31, at 399.
118. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Revising the FAA to Permit ExpandedJudicialReview of
Arbitration Awards, 8 NEV. L.J. 214 (2007); Paul F. Kirgis, Judicial Review and the Limits of
ArbitralAuthority: Lessons from the Law of Contract, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 99 (2007); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Keeping Arbitrationsfrom Becoming Kangaroo Courts, 8 NEV. L.J. 251 (20072008); Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospectsfor Judicial Review
ofArbitralAwards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929 (2010).
119. See Chad M. Oldfather, UniversalDeNovo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 319-20
(2009) (examining the underlying assumptions of universal de novo review by appellate courts,
including: "(1) that there are correct answers to legal questions; (2) that those answers are
ascertainable; (3) that those answers are articulable; and (4) that appellate courts are relatively
more competent than trial courts at ascertaining and articulating those answers" due to structural
advantages and their role in achieving the systemic needs of the legal system); Stephen 1.Vladeck,
Boumediene's Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation ofPowers, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2107, 2145 (2009) (observing that if the denial of access to courts is understood as a
separation-of-powers injury depriving the judiciary of its ability to check executive power, then
"judicial review ensures that it is that courts, and not prison wardens or other executive branch
officials, who decide the merits of the underlying claim." (emphasis added)).
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should use the arbitrary and capricious standard when reviewing arbitral
awards that are accompanied by reasoned opinions.1 20 Professor Jeff
Stempel has proposed that even though arbitrators' findings of fact should
continue to be granted deference, their conclusions of law should be
subjected to de novo review in the same manner as judicial awards. 12 1 Both
of these proposals, however, would require legislative action to amend the
FAA. 12 2 Such efforts have been stymied for years, 12 3 and it is difficult to
predict when the gridlock will end.124
Other academics have suggested that parties or judges could act to
improve upon the current grounds for, and standards of, judicial review.
Professor Maureen Weston has proposed that parties should be able to
provide in their arbitration agreement that an arbitrator will be deemed to
"exceed his authority" under state law if he issues a ruling that is not legally
correct.'2 5 Professor Paul Kirgis, meanwhile, has urged that courts should
120. See Cole, Revising the FAA supra note 118, at 232 (observing that such review would
only be possible when awards were accompanied by reasoned opinions). But see Mandatory
Arbitration Clauses: Proposalsfor Reform of Consumer-Defendant Arbitration, 122 HARV. L.

REv. 1170, 1178 (2009) (observing that requiring a reasoned explanation "would likely improve
the average accuracy of arbitration decisions, but it would also increase the costs of pursuing the
claim in arbitration. . . . If the concern were simply to produce fair outcomes at any cost, this
solution might be superior to the current system of arbitration, but, if that is the goal, both would
be inferior to simply relying on courts in the first place. The essential goal of arbitration is to
provide fair outcomes at a socially affordable price.").
121. Stempel, supra note 118, at 265-66; see also Darren P. Lindamood, Redressing the
ArbitrationProcess:An Alternative to the ArbitrationFairnessAct of 2009, 45 WAKE FOREST L.

REv. 291,312(2010).
122. Cole, Revising the FAA, supra note 118, at 232-33; Stempel, supra note 118, at 257.
123. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 failed to pass in the House of Representatives, but
it was later reintroduced as the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1020, 112th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2011).
124. There have been more targeted legislative successes, however. Indeed, Professor Cole's
legislative proposal might have more traction if it was directed specifically toward consumer
protection legislation. See Cole, Revising the FAA, supra note 118, at 218. In addition to more
rigorous judicial review, commentators have proposed: state regulation of arbitrators, arbitration
procedures and arbitral awards. See Stephen K. Huber, State Regulation of Arbitration
Proceedings:Judicial Review of ArbitrationAwards by State Courts, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 509, 509, 511-13 (2009); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping MandatoryArbitration: Is it Just?,

57 STAN. L. REv. 1631, 1634-35 (2005). Some commentators have focused on the disclosure
requirements for arbitral providers. See, e.g., Jaimie Kent, The Debate in Calfornia Over and
Implications of New Ethical Standards for Arbitrator Disclosure: Are the Changes Valid or

Appropriate?, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 903 (2004); see also Ruth V. Glick, California
ArbitrationReform: The Aftermath, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 119 (2003).
125. See Weston, supra note 118, at 951; see also Sean C. Wagner, Unchecked: How Frazier
v. CitiFinancial Eliminated Judicially Cieated Grounds for Vacatur Under the Federal

Arbitration Act, 64 OK. L. REV. 235, 249-55 (2012) (reviewing circuit split regarding whether
manifest disregard fits within the ground for vacatur provided by FAA's Section 10(a)(4)-i.e.,
arbitrators exceeding their powers). But see Brian T. Burns, Note, Freedom, Finality,and Federal
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review arbitral awards for unconscionability just as they would the
arbitration agreement, because the award is the creature of the contract
between the parties.126
Despite the party-empowering underpinnings of arbitration, 127
however, the Supreme Court held in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v.

Mattel1 2 8 that contracting parties do not have the authority to require more
searching review from public courts.129 The Supreme Court in Hall even
hinted that the courts reviewing arbitral awards pursuant to the FAA do not
have the authority to develop their own, more searching standard of review,
such as manifest disregard of the law.1 30 Continued judicial deference to
arbitrators and their awards is apparently an integral and "fundamental" part
of the FAA.131
V. LOOKING FOR GUIDANCE IN OTHER AREAS OF JURISPRUDENCE THAT
ARE CHARACTERIZED BY JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND THE POTENTIAL
FOR STRUCTURAL BIAS

Importantly, the sort of structural bias that is so troubling in disparate
party arbitration is neither a new problem nor one that is particularly unique
to arbitration.1 32 There are other legal contexts in which Congress has
explicitly authorized corporations and other organizations to select and fund
their own decision-making tribunals. Such tribunals have then possessed
the authority to make determinations regarding the corporations' or
organizations' contractual obligations and have been granted deferential
judicial review of their decisions.'3 3 One such context involves private
Preemption: Seeking Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under State Law After
Hall Street, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1813, 1816 (2010).
126. See Kirgis, supra note 118; see also Huber, supra note 124, at 539-44 (proposing
contract-based standards for judicial review of arbitration awards).
127. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, Judicial Approbation in Building the Civilization of
Arbitration, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1343, 1367 (2009).
128. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).

129. Id at 586, 590.
130.

Id at 584.

131.

See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9-10 (2006); see also Thomas S. Meriwether, Comment, Limiting

Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act: Striking the Right

Balance, 44 Hous. L. REv. 739, 766 (2007) (urging that "contractual agreements forgoing the
right of appeal from a district court decision confirming or vacating an arbitral award should be
enforced" but "agreements purporting to eliminate or limit the scope of a district court's review of
an arbitral award should not").
132. See Welsh, Embedded Neutrals, supra note 31, at 405.
133. See Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C., 552 U.S. at 586-88; Anthony W. Rodgers, Procedural
Protections During Medical Peer Review: A Reinterpretation of the Health Care Qualify

Improvement Act of 1986, 111 PENN. ST. L. REv. 1047, 1047-48 (2006-2007).
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administrators' pension and disability benefit determinations pursuant to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").134
Somehow, in this context, the Supreme Court has managed to acknowledge
the existence of structural bias and make it a relevant and important factor
to be considered as part of deferential judicial review. Further, the
Supreme Court has provided guidance to lower courts regarding the weight
to be given to structural bias in this context and has provided examples of
the information required to assess such weight. Structural bias has been
given the stature of tiebreaker in close cases. Finally and most important
for the purposes of this Article, the Supreme Court has also incentivized the
provision of structural and procedural safeguards in order to reduce the
potency of the structural incentives that encourage biased decision-making.
In other words, the Supreme Court has incentivized the provision of
safeguards that will enhance the likelihood of accurate decision-making.
All of this has occurred while maintaining a deferential standard of review.
At this point, therefore, this Article will turn to judicial review of benefit
denials in the ERISA context.
VI. A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF ERISA's ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF
STRUCTURAL BIAS WHILE RETAINING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

The Supreme Court has observed that "ERISA represents a 'careful
balancing"l35 between encouragement of employers to provide pension,

health and other employee benefit plans and the protection of employees'
rights under such plans.' 3 6 Not surprisingly, employers and insurance
companies have urged that if legislators and courts make "the provision of

benefits too onerous, employers may simply decline to provide them." 37
This is more than a little reminiscent of the warnings issued by the Chamber

134. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88
Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., 29 U.S.C.,
and 42 U.S.C.).
135. See Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1648-49 (2010) (citing Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 215).
136. See id.
137. See Katherine T. Vukadin, Delayed and Denied: Toward An Effective ERISA Remedy
For ImproperProcessingof HealthcareClaims, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 331, 373

(2011) (citing Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1648 (2010)); 29 C.F.R. § 2560.502-1(b)
(2011) (noting the purely voluntary nature of the system); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
HEALTH, EDUC. & HUMAN SERVS. DIv., B-276104, EMPLOYER-BASED MANAGED CARE PLANS:
ERISA's EFFECT ON REMEDIES FOR BENEFIT DENIALS AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 16 (1998).
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of Commerce, Wireless Association, Directv, Comcast and Dell in their
38
amicus briefs in Concepcion.1
Nonetheless, ERISA mandates the following: plans must provide
employees with information regarding such plans' features and funding;
those whomanage and control plan assets bear fiduciary responsibilitiesl 39
and must establish a grievance and appeals process for participants who
seek benefits;14 0 and employees who have been denied plan benefits have
the right to challenge such denials in federal court.141 Importantly,
however, ERISA does not specify the standard to be used by courts when
reviewing challenges to administrators' benefit denials. 142
In Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch,143 the Supreme Court
turned to the principles of trust law to determine the appropriate standard of
judicial review.'44 The Court found, among other things, that a plan
administrator's benefit determination should be understood as a fiduciary
act, that the plan administrator is a fiduciary who owes a special duty of
loyalty to plan beneficiaries, 145 and that courts should use a de novo
standard in reviewing an administrator's denial of benefits-unless the plan
itself provides otherwise.
Just as a court begins its assessment of a
trustee's performance by turning to the provisions of the relevant trust
document, a court reviewing a benefit administrator's decision must begin
with the standard of review provided in the terms of the plan.147 Thus, if a
plan grants discretionary authority to the administrator to determine
whether a beneficiary's claim is eligible and valid, courts are required to
use a deferential standard when reviewing a benefit denial.148

138. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. It appears that the Amicus Brief filed by
CTIA, the Wireless Association in support of AT&T, served as a source of inspiration for portions
of Justice Scalia's opinion. Brief of CTIA - The Wireless Association as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-893),
2010 WL 3183858.
139. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 93-406
(codified as amended in scattered sections of29 U.S.C.); 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006).
140. Health Plans & Benefits, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/healthplans/erisa.htm (last visited August 12, 2012).
141. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2006); see also § 1132(a)(1)(B).
142.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 489 U.S. at 109.

143.
144.

Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
Id.atll0-l1.

145. See John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and
Judicial Review of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 1315, 1326 (2007)

(describing the care norm or duty of prudent administration as well as the loyalty rule).
146. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. at 102. See also Langbein, supra note 145, at 1323.
147. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. at 102.

148. Id
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Not surprisingly, most plans now grant discretionary authority to plan
administrators, and thus deferential judicial review is the norm rather than
the exception. 149 Courts have used a variety of specific formulations- e.g.,
abuse of discretion,so arbitrary and capricious,"s unreasonable 52-but all
are deferential.153 Once again, there are striking similarities here to the
deferential standard of review used by courts when determining whether to
vacate an arbitral award.
Judicial deference in the ERISA context is often problematic due to the
pervasiveness of structural bias. 15 4 Plan administrators generally are
responsible for both determining the validity of an employee's claim and
actually paying the amounts determined to be owed. The resulting
structural bias is most obvious when the employer is also the plan
administrator, responsible for funding the plan, evaluating claims and
paying out benefits.155 "In such a circumstance, 'every dollar provided in
benefits is a dollar spent by... the employer; and every dollar saved. . . is a
dollar in [the employer's] pocket. . . . The employer's fiduciary interest may

counsel in favor of granting a borderline claim while its immediate financial
interest counsels to the contrary.'" 1 56 A very similar structural bias exists if
a company provides an internal, company-sponsored arbitration process to
decide debt collection matters and consumer claims.
Relying upon the trust law principles that are relevant in the ERISA
context, the Supreme Court held in Firestone that an employer serving as
plan administrator is operating under a conflict of interest, and such conflict
has to be "weighed [by the reviewing court] as a 'factor in determining
whether there [was] an abuse of discretion"" 57 by the employeradministrator who had denied an employee's claim for benefits.
But many employers turn to others, particularly insurance companies,
and outsource responsibility for managing the plan funds, making benefit
149. See Langbein, supra note 145, at 1317 (objecting that the judicial deference shown in
trust law to the wishes of transferors is due to the status of the normal private trust as "essentially
a gift;" in contrast, ERISA's invocation of trust law was meant "to restrict rather than to promote
the autonomy of the employer over its employee benefit plans.").
150. Id. at 1320; see also Green v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2011).
151. Langbein, supra note 145, at 1322; see also Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension
Fund, 609 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2010).
152. Langbein, supra note 145, at 1339-40; see also Schexnayder v. Hartford Life and Acc.
Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2010).
153. Langbein, supra note 145, at 1317, 1321-22, 1324.
154.

See id. at 1326.

155.
156.

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 106 (2008).
Id. at 112.

157.

Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §187 cmt. d

(1959)).
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determinations and distributing payments to beneficiaries." 8 Obviously,
there is an inherent potential for conflict of interest in the insurer's reliance
on the employer for business. Arguably, though, this use of a third party
should reduce the degree of conflict of interest or structural bias, in the
same manner that the use of an outside arbitral organization should mitigate
structural bias in consumer arbitration. Indeed, in the ERISA context, and
despite the language of Firestone, some courts refused to acknowledge
"inherent" or "simple and commonplace" bias as a conflict of interest,
noting that the amount involved in an individual claim is often just too
small to sway a decision-maker in light of many insurers' exponentially
larger gross revenues, 1 and the marketplace's punishment of any insurers
who develop a reputation for self-interested errors in benefit
determinations.160
But this faith in the selflessness of decision-makers, and in the rigor
imposed by economies of scale and the market, has not always been
justified.' 6' The existence and effects of structural bias among insurers in
the ERISA context was revealed in 2002, in a scandal involving the thenlargest American insurer specializing
in disability insurance,
Unum/Provident Corporation (Unum).162 At that time, evidence began to
come to light that Unum had engaged in a variety of practices that might
have helped it to maximize cost-effectiveness in claims processingl 6 3-but
that also constituted abusive claims denials-e.g., pressuring its claimsprocessing employees to deny claims in order "to meet or surpass budget
goals,"'6 pressuring staff physicians to review claims too quickly to
analyze them properly, not permitting physicians to request additional
information or tests to aid their review of claims, and discouraging
158. See Vukadin, supra note 137, at 339; Id. at 339-40.
159. See Langbein, supra note 145, at 1327-28.
160.

See id. at 1328.

161. Indeed, not all courts expressed this faith. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits, for
example, responded to structural bias by abandoning plan-mandated deferential review and
shifting the burden to the administrator, as fiduciary, to show the reasonableness of a denial and
its benefit to the class of beneficiaries. See Beverly Cohen, Divided Loyalties: How the Metlife v.
Glenn StandardDiscounts ERISA Fiduciaries'Conflicts ofInterest, 2009 UTAH L. REv. 955, 969-

70 (2009) (discussing courts' disagreement on the existence of a conflict). The Ninth Circuit
acknowledged the structural bias or "inherent" conflict as a factor to be considered. Id. at 965.
162. See Langbein, supra note 145, at 1315. Other insurers had also engaged in conduct
found to represent abusive denials of benefits. Id. at 1321-22 n. 41.
163. Id at 1315. See also Cohen, supra note 161, at 964 (describing how courts were
reluctant to recognize a conflict when third-party administrators were making benefit denials, but
some courts recognized that administrators might want to prove their cost-effectiveness in order to
be rehired for another contract term or avoid determining third party claims in a manner
inconsistent with the approach it used for another employer).
164. See Langbein, supranote 145, at 1318.
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physicians from assisting beneficiaries to perfect their claims for disability
insurance benefits.'6 5 After litigation was commenced, discovery revealed a
damning memorandum written by an Unum executive, in which the
executive exulted over the advantages provided to the company by ERISA,
including preemption of state law, abandonment of jury trials, banning of
compensatory and punitive damages, and deferential judicial review. 66 The
memorandum observed, for example, that due to the deferential standard of
review established by the Firestone court as applicable to benefit denials,
Unum faced much less risk of liability than it otherwise would.167
Professor John H. Langbein detailed the Unum scandal in an article
published in 2007.16' He then observed:
Broadly speaking, there are two plausible interpretations of the
Unum/Provident scandal. Unum could be such an outlier that the saga
lacks legal policy implications. On this view, a rogue insurance company
behaved exceptionally badly, it got caught and was sanctioned, and its fate
should deter others. The other reading of these events is less sanguine....
[C]onflicted plan decisionmaking is a structural feature of ERISA plan
administration. The danger pervades the ERISA-plan world that a selfinterested plan decisionmaker will take advantage of its license under
[Firestone v.] Bruch to line its own pockets by denying meritorious

claims. Cases of abusive benefit denials involving other disability insurers
abound. Unum turns out to have been a clumsy villain, but in the hands of
subtler operators such misbehavior is much harder to detect.169
The Unum scandal was a dramatic wake-up call within the ERISA
context-in much the same manner that the Minnesota Attorney General's
action against National Arbitration Forum has served as a wake-up call
regarding the dangers of structural bias in mandatory predispute consumer
arbitration.o70 Indeed, the parallels between these two cases are nearly
overwhelming and will be discussed infra.
Nonetheless, over the years, a conflict had emerged among the federal
circuits regarding whether structural bias should be considered a conflict in
the ERISA context and, if it was, how it should affect the standard of
review to be used by courts reviewing insurers' benefit denials. As noted
supra, some federal circuits refused to recognize a standard or ubiquitous
conflict as a conflict of interest.' 7 ' Other circuits took a very different
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 1319.
Id at 1321.
Id
Id. at 1317-21.
Id. at 1321.

170.

See Welsh, Embedded Neutrals, supra note 31, at 471.

171.

See Cohen, supra note 161, at 960-65.
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approach, responding to a showing of inherent conflict by shifting the
burden to the insurer to show the reasonableness of its denial or adopting de
novo and other non-deferential (even less than de novo) standards of

review.12
In 2008, the Supreme Court responded to this split in the circuits with
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Glenn.173 Metropolitan Life (MetLife)
had served as the administrator and insurer of a Sears ERISA-governed
disability insurance plan and had denied disability benefits to a Sears
employee, Wanda Glenn.' 74 As is true in many of these cases, MetLife had
determined that Glenn was entitled to disability insurance benefits for an
initial 24-month period because she was unable to perform her particular
job.17 At the cohclusion of this 24-month period, however, the plan
provided that Glenn was entitled to continued disability benefits only if she
could not perform any occupation for which she was qualified.1 6 MetLife
denied Glenn's application for these benefits, finding that Glenn could
perform in a sedentary occupation.'" Glenn challenged the denial in
federal court.178 The District Court denied the employee's request for relief
and entered judgment for the plan administrator.'7 9 Using an abuse of
discretion standard but treating MetLife's conflict of interest as a "relevant
factor," the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. 8 0 The Supreme Court
affirmed.' 8 '
In his majority opinion, Justice Breyer observed that with ERISA,
Congress intended to "offer employees enhanced protection of their
benefits."l 8 2 He further observed that reliance on the protections offered by
the market was insufficient due to employers' (and not employees') control
of the selection of plan administrators and employers' potentially greater
interest in low rates and premium payments than in accurate claims
172. See Cohen, supra note 161, at 966-71.
173. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008).
174. Id. at 108-09.
175. Id. at 109.
176. See id
177. Id. MetLife had encouraged Glenn to apply for Social Security disability benefits and
then chose to disregard the Social Security Administration's finding that Glenn could not work.
MetLife also emphasized one physician report indicating the Glenn could work at the expense of
other, more detailed medical reports and failed to provide all of the treating physician reports to its
own hired experts. Finally, MetLife ignored evidence regarding the effects of stress upon Glenn.
Id at 110.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.atll0-11.
181. Id. at119.
182. Id. at 114 (citing Varity Co. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996)).
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processing.183 Interestingly, Justice Breyer also observed that ERISA itself
imposes fiduciary responsibilities on administrators, thus requiring "higherthan-marketplace quality standards."l 84 For purposes of ERISA, therefore,
the Supreme Court held that when a structural conflict exists, it represents a
conflict of interest that must be acknowledged.185 This holding was
surprisingly significant.186 A structural bias that might be deemed "normal"
or "unremarkable" in the context of a commercial contract was made
"abnormal" or "aberrant" in the fiduciary context of ERISA.187
Based on the principles of trust law, however, the majority further
concluded that the existence of such a conflict could not be permitted to
trigger the "special burden of proof rules,"'1 or "special procedural or
evidentiary rules,"' 89 or the less deferential standards of review that several
circuits had adopted. 190 Justice Breyer explained that courts were required
to continue to grant deference to administrators' decisions and reverse them
only if they found abuse of discretion:
Trust law continues to apply a deferential standard of review to the
discretionary decision making of a conflicted trustee, while at the same
time requiring the reviewing judge to take account of the conflict when
determining whether the trustee, substantively or procedurally, has abused
his discretion."1 91
But if reviewing courts are required to maintain deference as they review
administrators' benefit denials, what meaningful role can structural bias or
"inherent" conflict play in their disposition of the case? Firestone,after all,
already required "the reviewing judge to take account of the conflict." 92
Justice Breyer rejected the parallels between ERISA-regulated
obligations and contract law principles that had been urged by employers
and insurers.19 3 Instead, Justice Breyer invoked courts' oversight of

183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id at 115.
See id.
See id. at 116.

187. But see Cohen, supra note 161, at 991-92 (questioning whether ERISA beneficiaries are
receiving a duty of loyalty from insurance fiduciaries if such insurers are processing both ERISA
and non-ERISA claims in the same manner, with the same internal guidelines and claims
processing software, and urging that claims processing should be conducted by randomly-assigned
third parties).
188. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 116.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 116-17.
191. Id. at 115.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 115-17.
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governmental officials' and administrative judges' decisions interpreting
and enforcing the legal entitlements established by federal statute:
We believe that Firestone means what the word "factor" implies, namely,
that when judges review the lawfulness of benefit denials, they will often
take account of several different considerations of which a conflict of
interest is one. This kind of review is no stranger to the judicial system.
Not only trust law, but also administrative law, can ask judges to
determine lawfulness by taking account of several different, often casespecific, factors, reaching a result by weighing all together... .194
Finally, Justice Breyer explained how administrators' conflicted decisionmaking-or structural bias-would factor into judicial review of
administrators' denial of benefits:
... [A]ny one factor will act as a tiebreaker when the other factors are
closely balanced, the degree of closeness necessary depending upon the
tiebreaking factor's inherent or case-specific importance. The conflict of
interest at issue here, for example, should prove more important (perhaps
of great importance) where circumstances suggest a higher likelihood that
it affected the benefits decision, including, but not limited to, cases where
an insurance comany administrator has a history of biased claims
administration... .
Chief Justice Roberts did not join this part of the Court's opinion because
he found its requirement that courts consider the "mere existence of a
conflict in every case" to be insufficiently "constrained" 9 6 and thus likely
to permit judges to engage in inappropriately "exacting scrutiny" of
administrators' decision-making.19 7 Nonetheless, his concurrence provides
several additional examples of structural bias that would suggest "a higher
likelihood" of influencing the denial of benefits-and thus would support a
finding of abuse of discretion.' 98 These examples include: evidence

194. Id. at 117 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187, cmt. b
(1971)). Cf, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-417 (1971)
(reviewing governmental decision for abuse of discretion); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474 (1951) (reviewing agency factfinding).
195. Id
196. Id. at 121 (Roberts, J., concurring).
197. Id. See also id at 128 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's opinion as
"nothing but de novo review in sheep's clothing" and proclaiming that "the notion that there are
degrees of deference is absurd.. . . [T]he court either defers, or it does not. 'Some deference,' or
'less than total deference,' is no deference at all."); Cohen, supra note 161 at 990-91 (expressing
agreement with Scalia's analysis in his Glenn dissent that the decision offers courts the
opportunity to engage in de novo review, but also observing that Glenn only "moves us closer to
the de novo approach" and questioning "whether it achieves the 'undivided loyalty' that ERISA
promises to plan beneficiaries").
198. MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 120-22 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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regarding terms in a benefit plan that give "'a bonus for administrators who
denied benefits to every 10' beneficiary,"" 99 evidence of "incentives and
bonuses to claims reviewers for 'claims savings,"' 20 0 evidence of "a pattern
or practice of unreasonably denying meritorious claims," 20 1 and evidence of
"a pattern of erroneous and arbitrary benefits denials, bad faith contract
misinterpretations, and other unscrupulous tactics."202 Graphically, this sort
of evidence would be weighty enough to shift the scales of justice otherwise
tipped deferentially toward the plan administrator.
In the majority opinion, meanwhile, Justice Breyer went further and
provided instruction to administrators regarding their ability to influence the
weight of a structural bias through the meaningful institutionalization of
protections againststructural bias:
It [the conflict at interest here] should prove less important (perhaps to the
vanishing point) where the administrator has taken active steps to reduce
potential bias and to promote accuracy, for example, by walling off claims
administrators from those interested in firm finances, or by imposing
management checks that penalize inaccurate decisionmaking irrespective
of whom the inaccuracy benefits. . 203
Justice Breyer's wide-ranging citations to examples of structural safeguards
may be almost as instructive as the explicit guidance contained in the words
204 H eee
of the opinion supra. He referenced academics' recommendations that
banks establish "interdepartmental information walls to reduce bank
conflict" 205 and that administrative agencies put into place "internal
controls" to produce "administrative accuracy" 206 He cited to the assertions
in one of the amicus briefs that insurers have "incentives to reward claims
processors for their accuracy." 207 These structural safeguards would, of
course, be in addition to ERISA's general requirement that plan
administrators provide claimants with a reasoned basis, in writing, for the
denial of benefits.208

199. Id. at 123.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id
203. Id. at 117 (majority opinion).
204. See id. at 114-19.
205. Id. at 117.
206. Id. at 118.
207. Id. at 117-18 (citing Brief For The Blue Cross And Blue Shield Association As Amicus
Curiae In Support Of Petitioner at 15, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105 (2008)
(No. 06-923) 2008 WL 596062.
208. See 29 U.S.C. § 1133(2006).
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Following Glenn,209 most courts have accepted that ubiquitous
conflicted decision-making is nonetheless a conflict. 21 0 They have also
211
With the
accepted that they must use a deferential standard of review.
notable exception of the Ninth Circuit,2 12 courts have not presumed that the
existence of conflicted decision-making, by itself, will be enough to tip the
balance of deferential review. Rather they have sought to assess the
conflict's "weight" by examining whether: the structure of ERISA funds is
such that a benefit denial will reduce the amounts paid by an employer into
the plan; 213 the savings produced by denials are likely to be significant to
the employer 214 or the insurer;21 5 administrators or outside reviewers
sufficiently acknowledged contrary doctors' reportS216 or awards from the
Social Security Administration; 2 17 and the number of referrals and amount
209. See Rosanne Marie Cross, Comment, ERISA for Dummies: Does MetLife Simplify and
Clarify, 26 GA. ST. L. REv. 1335, 1344-52 (2010) (summarizing federal circuits' responses to
Glenn).
210. See id. at 1344-53; Blankenship v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir.
2011); Edwards v. Briggs and Stratton Retirement Plan, 639 F.3d 355 (7th Cir. 2011); Frankton v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 432 Fed. App'x. 210 (4th Cir. 2011); Green v. Union Sec. Ins. Co.,
646 F.3d 1042 (8th Cir. 2011); Salomaa v. Honda Long Term Disability Plan, 642 F.3d 666 (9th
Cir. 2011); Cusson v. Liberty Life Assur. Co. of Boston, 592 F.3d 215 (1st Cir. 2010); Durakovic
v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension Fund, 609 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2010); Denmark v. Liberty Life Assur.
Co. of Boston, 566 F.3d I (1st Cir. 2009); Kiel v. Life Ins. Co. of North America, 345 Fed. App'x.
52 (2009). But see Eugene S. v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1133
(2011) ("Asserting a conflict based on a generalized economic incentive, such as attracting more
business through the denial of claims, without more, is 'insufficient to rise to the level of a legally
cognizable conflict of interest."') (citing Finley v. Hewlett Packard Co. Empl. Benefits Org.
Income Prot. Plan, 379 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2004)).
211. Cross, supra note 209, at 1338-41; see also cases cited supra note 210.
212. See Salomaa, 642 F.3d at 675-76 (applying the abuse of discretion standard but "with the
qualification that a higher degree of skepticism is appropriate when the administrator has a
conflict of interest").
213. See Durakovic, 609 F.3d at 138-40 (citing MetropolitanLife Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 128).
214. See Miller v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 632 F.3d 837, 847 (3d Cir. 2011) (observing that the
American Airlines' benefit plan "lacked funds to meet a significant amount of its projected benefit
obligation" and thus, "every dollar that American saved by reducing disability payments
decreased its projected benefit obligation.").
215. See Blankenship v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 644 F.3d 1350, 1357 (11th Cir. 2011)
(acknowledging that every dollar not paid to a beneficiary is a dollar saved by MetLife in the short
run).
216. See Miller, 632 F.3d at 843-44, 853-54 (illustrating how physicians appointed by
American to evaluate a claimant's medical record came to different conclusions than the
claimant's treating physician, despite acknowledging the claimant's treating physician's
conclusion; the outside, appointed physicians' opinions were relied on by American, rather than
the claimant's treating physician).
217. See Schexnayder v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 600 F.3d 465,471 (5th Cir. 2010)
(illustrating how Hartford ignored a Social Security Administration determination that the
claimant was fully disabled and unable to perform work); see also Roy F. Harmon, The Debate
Over Deference in the ERISA Setting - JudicialReview ofDecisions by Conflicted Fiduciaries,54
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of money paid by administrators to independent physicians was
significant.2 18 Although some courts have asserted that they are "dutybound to inquire into what steps a plan administrator has taken to insulate
the decision-making process against the potentially pernicious effects of
structural conflicts," 219 most courts have placed the burden squarely upon
claimants to introduce evidence to substantiate the conflict's weight.220
This is, of course, a significant burden.2 2 1
But-and this is extraordinarily important in the context of disparate
dispute resolution of any type-Glenn now entitles claimants to request
discovery regarding the details of insurers' and employers' claims
handling.222
Indeed, most of Chief Justice Roberts' examples of
"weightier" structural bias described supra would require claimants
challenging benefit denials to request, and courts to grant, targeted
discovery that goes well beyond the "administrative record" established
before the claims administrator. If access to information is power-and it
is-there should be little wonder that Justice Scalia dissented in Glenn and
so vehemently scorned both the majority's "fondness for a judge-liberating
totality-of-the-circumstances 'test"' and his colleagues' apparent smallmindedness in presuming that "all fiduciaries with a conflict act in their

selfish interest." 223
S.D. L. REv. 1, 23 (2009) ("Glenn provides a counterweight that may be employed to argue for

greater development of the administrative record in the event a conflict of interest exists. In such
cases, it may be argued that the plan administrator's failure to develop the record should constitute
a factor in evaluating the reasonableness of the benefit denial.").
218. See Denmark v. Liberty Life Assur. Co., 566 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2009) (illustrating how
Liberty Life paid upwards of $2,000,000 and referred 1,204 files to NMR physicians between
2001 and 2003).
219. Id. at 9; see also Schexnayder, 600 F.3d at 470 ("Hartford did not take any precautions to
avoid or minimize the conflict resulting from its dual role as administrator and insurer of its
disability plan and specifically did not 'wall[ ] off claims administrators from those interested in
firm finances or ... impos[e] management checks that penalize inaccurate decisionmaking
irrespective of whom the inaccuracy benefits.' (quoting Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, 554 U.S. at
117)).

220. See Denmark, 566 F.3d at 6; Cusson v. Liberty Life Assur. Co., 592 F.3d 215, 225 (1st
Cir. 2010); Green v. Union Sec'y Ins. Co., 646 F.3d 1042, 1051-53 (8th Cir. 2011); Blankenship,

644 F.3d at 1355. But see Cohen, supranote 161, at 984-85 (urging that conflict of interest alone
has not converted a reasonable fiduciary decision into an unreasonable one and that post-Glenn
courts have resisted using conflict as a tiebreaker in close cases).
221. See Cohen, supranote 161, at 956.
222. See Harmon, supra note 217, at 24-25 (describing post-Glenn discovery to supplement
the administrative record and suggesting the potential application of administrative law-inspired
principles and practices).
223. Id. at 128, 133. Justice Scalia's presumption is diametrically opposed: "But if one is to
draw any inference about a fiduciary from the fact that he made an informed, reasonable, though
apparently self-serving discretionary decision, it should be that he suppressed his selfish interest
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Since Glenn was decided, courts have authorized the discovery
requested by employees.224 In those few (and inevitably suspicious)
instances when responses to court-ordered discovery have not been
forthcoming, courts have also made adverse inferences regarding what they
would have found.225
Meanwhile, insurers and employers have taken the initiative to put into
evidence the existence of structural safeguards, such as outside medical
review of files, 2 26 independent physician consultants' preparation of
detailed reports acknowledging all available evidence and tests,22 7 an
appeals process that involves different individuals than those who made the
initial denial,228 the absence of contact between the plan administrator and
the employer's financial advisors, 2 29 and the absence of incentives to deny
claims.230 Some courts have concluded that such structural and procedural
safeguards make the existence of a conflict of interest insignificant, and
have found no abuse of discretion.2 3 1 Other courts have found that such

(as the settlor anticipated) in compliance with his duties of good faith and loyalty. . . . Only such a
presumption can vindicate the trust principles and ERISA provisions that permit settlors to appoint
fiduciaries with a conflict in the first place." Id. at 133-34. Justice Scalia's willingness to place
nearly blind faith in conflicted fiduciaries is more than a little reminiscent of Justice White's
similar faith in agency officials. See Welsh, Embedded Neutrals, supra note 31, at 446, 454-57,
459. And truthfully, it is not clear to this author that Justice Scalia read the final version of the
majority opinion written by Justice Breyer and the nuanced weighting sketched there.
224. See, e.g., Denmark, 566 F.3d t at 10.
225. See, e.g., id. at 4-5. Discovery revealed that the insurer had referred 1,204 files and paid
"upwards of $2,000,000 to NMR physicians" during a two-year period; the court observed that the
insurer had then "refused, on burdensomeness grounds, to answer interrogatories regarding the
proportion" of referred files "in which claims had ultimately been allowed." The trial court drew
the inference that NMR had found against the claimants, and for the plan, 100% of the time.
226.

See, e.g., Miller, 632 F.3d at 843.

227. See, e.g., Frankton v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 432 Fed. App'x. 210, 216 (4th Cir.
2011).
228. See Durakovic, 609 F.3d at 140 (also noting that the appeals panel included union and
management representatives); Fortune v. Grp. Long Term Disability Plan for Emps. of Keyspan
Corp., 637 F.Supp. 2d 132, 144 (E.D.N.Y.) (2009).
229. Fortune,637 F.Supp. 2d at 144.
230. See Edwards v. Briggs & Stratton Ret. Plan, 639 F.3d 355, 365 (7th Cir. 2011); Fortune,
637 F.Supp. 2d at 144 (observing that Hartford had effectively "walled off' claims examiners
from the company's finance department by ensuring that an examiner's compensation would not
be based on his or her record of denying claims); see also Denmark, 566 F.3d at 10 (suggesting
that "[i]n future cases, plan administrators, aware of Glenn, can be expected as a matter of course
to document the procedures used to prevent or mitigate the effect of structural conflicts" with the
information then included in the administrative record).
231. See, e.g., Frankton,432 Fed. App'x. at 214, 216.
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safeguards can mitigate conflict, 23 2 but some have taken pains to point out
that the presence of such safeguards cannot be assumed to insulate an
administrator from the existence of a conflict.233 Judicial review of the
entire record is still required.
Has the structural bias that comes from conflicted decision-making,
now acknowledged as a conflict of interest, actually served as a tiebreaker
in close cases? Many would say not.234 Somehow, though, it is better than
the bald-faced denial of conflict that went before. It is this clear-eyed
acknowledgement of structural bias, and its potential to play the tiebreaker
role, that could be exported into the arbitration jurisprudence. The clarity
that comes with admitting the existence of conflict, combined with the
potential transparency and accountability offered by discovery into
administrators' claims processing, would at least create the potential to
enhance the reality of, and a skeptical public's perception of, the
thoroughness and accuracy of decision-making in mandatory predispute
arbitration.
VII. APPLICATION TO MANDATORY PREDISPUTE CONSUMER ARBITRATION
Structural bias has the potential to affect third party arbitral
organizations just as much as it has the potential to affect third party
insurers making benefit determinations.23 5 Indeed, the cautionary tale of the
National Arbitration Forum ("NAF"), which once handled the majority of
consumer arbitrations, 236 reveals the potential for structural bias.
Admittedly, the allegations contained in the Minnesota Attorney General's
complaint were never tested by a motion to dismiss, and the case never
went to trial or even summary judgment.237 Nonetheless, the complaint and
newspaper reports combined to paint a picture of a complex web of private
actors and overlapping financial and business relationships, all
232. See Eugene v. Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of N.J., 663 F.3d 1124, 1133 (10th Cir.
2011) (citing Finley v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Emp. Benefits Org. Income Prot. Plan, 379 F.3d
1168, 1176 (10th Cir. 2004)).
233. See Miller, 632 F.3d at 847-48 (observing that the medical review by third party Western
Medical Evaluators had occurred after the termination of benefits and that it was not binding
because American could seek further review of the report's conclusions if it was dissatisfied with
the analysis).
234. See, e.g., Cross, supra note 209, at 1359 (urging a return to the principles of trust law
requiring an actual conflict, in order to "[slave time, preserve judicial resources, and establish
clarification for ERISA claimants and administrators."); Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640
(2010).
235. See Welsh, Embedded Neutrals, supra note 31, 399-402.
236. See id. at 427-30.
237. See id. at 430.
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"motivated. . .by a shared pecuniary interest in ensuring that consumer
arbitration assisted the debt collection process and the production of profits
for all of the investors associated with that process." 238 Credit card
companies brought their collection matters to Mann Bracken, the large law
firm, for debt collection. 2 3 9 If they were unsuccessful, the Mann Bracken
lawyers referred the cases to the for-profit NAF for arbitration (which had
advertised arbitration to credit card companies as a means to get customers
to "basically hand you the money"). NAF and Forthright (a new company
created by NAF and the private equity firm of Accretive to handle the
financial aspects of NAF's operation) were responsible for making the
referrals to NAF's pool of arbitrators, one of whom allegedly stopped
receiving referrals after she found for a customer and against a credit card
company on a relatively substantial counterclaim.2 40 The arbitrators then
conducted arbitration proceedings-and found for the credit card companies
nearly 95% of the time. 241 The credit card companies then turned to the
courts, which transformed the arbitral awards into judgments.24 2 Axiant,
another new company created by Accretive and members of Mann Bracken,
then took over and proceeded to collect on the judgments.24 3 In this picture,
NAF and arbitration were no longer focused on dispute resolution as an end
in and of itself. Rather, NAF had joined with Accretive and Mann Bracken
to exploit consumer arbitration's "billion-dollar business" potential, as
imagined by Accretive. 24
Importantly, NAF quickly settled with the Minnesota Attorney
General. 2 4 5 The organization is no longer providing consumer arbitration
services. 246 It is tempting for many dispute resolution proponents to
understand NAF as an aberration. Likely, many in the ERISA context view
Unum similarly, as an outlier or a rogue. It becomes tempting to do
nothing, to assume the culprit has been found, and the crisis has been
averted. That could be exactly right.
But Glenn and its progeny in the ERISA context make it clear that it is
also possible to choose to be more proactive than that. It is possible for
courts to continue to grant deferential review to arbitral awards, as required

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at427-30, 467.
Id. at 429-30.
Id. at 437-38.
Id. at 430.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 428, 430.

245. Id.
246.

Id.
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by the FAA, while also subjecting the evidence of structural bias to more
rigorous examination. Further, Glenn suggests that structural bias can and
should be understood as "evident partiality." The rigor comes in the next
step-in assessing the gravity, or weight, of such partiality.24 7 Just as many
do in the context of ERISA, courts can place the burden of demonstrating
the severity of the partiality upon consumers (and employees, nursing home
patients and any others subject to mandatory predispute arbitration clauses
in adhesive contracts). But they would also need to be more willing to
grant consumers (and employees, nursing home patients and others
involved in disparate party arbitration) the right to pursue post-award
discovery into corporations', agencies' and arbitral firms' management of
their arbitration procedures. 248 And if the resulting evidence demonstrates
partiality that has a "high likelihood" of influencing arbitral decisionmaking, courts could and should refuse to enforce the resulting arbitral
awards.
At this point, it makes sense to return to the clause at issue in
Concepcion. Earlier, this Article noted that the provisions of the clause are
likely to encourage consumers to pursue their individual claims. 2 49 But are
the clause's provisions also sufficiently likely to "reduce potential bias and
promote accuracy" in the arbitral process? Based on the Supreme Court's
description of the clause in Concepcion, we know that if a consumer's
claim reaches arbitration, the consumer can choose the form of arbitration
that she would prefer-i.e., in person, by telephone or based only on paper
submissions.250 We also know that the arbitration must occur in the county
in which customer was billed.25 1 These provisions appear quite reassuring.
247.

See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 554 U.S. at 106; see also AT&T Mobility LLC, 131 S. Ct.

at 1752 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002)).
248. Courts currently grant post-arbitral award discovery sparingly and require the party who
seeks discovery to demonstrate "clear evidence of impropriety" or first make out a preliminary or
prima facie case to vacate the award. See, e.g., Midwest Generation EME, LLC v. Continuum
Chemical Corporation, 768 F. Supp.2d 939, 943, 946 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (refusing to permit party to
take post-award discovery when party was seeking vacatur based on evident partiality; explaining
that party had failed to meet the "clear evidence" standard and that relaxing the standard would
undermine arbitration's "essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway"); Vollers Excavating
& Const., Inc. v. Watchung Square Associates, L.L.C., No. L-547-02, 2009 WL 2208563 at *10
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jul. 27, 2009) (finding that party seeking post-award discovery had
failed to make out prima facie case of undisclosed bias sufficient to support a finding of evident
partiality); Antietam Indus., Inc. v. Morgan Keegan & Co., Inc., No. 6:12-cv-1250-Orl-36TBS,
2012 WL 4513763 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 2012) (permitting post-award discovery). The heightened
potential for structural bias in disparate party arbitration could be found sufficient to make out a
preliminary or primafacie case.
249. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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By providing the consumer with the opportunity to tailor the proceeding to
her capacities and circumstances, these provisions are likely to enhance her
ability to be heard 25 2 and thus promote the accuracy of a final decision.
AT&T's clause also provides that the consumer can choose to sue in
small claims court rather than arbitration.25 3 On its face, this provision is
also reassuring because it provides the consumer with an opt-out from
arbitration. Indeed, this provision seems to harness the power of healthy
competition between public courts and private arbitration providers. But
we would need to know more about the small claims courts available to the
consumer. These courts tend to have low jurisdictional caps. Further, as
states have reduced funding for their courts, some courts have been forced
to reduce their hours or even close for full days during the week. 25 4
Obviously, such an operational change has the potential to reduce
consumers' access to small claims courts. Thus, it is not clear whether the
opt-out provision in AT&T's clause would actually have the effect of
reducing bias and promoting accuracy. It depends.
Last and perhaps most strikingly, though, the clause at issue in
Concepcion provides that if the consumer receives an arbitration award
greater than AT&T's last written settlement offer, AT&T must pay a $7,500
minimum recovery to the consumer and twice the amount of the consumer's
attorney's fees.255 On its face, this last provision would seem quite likely to
reduce potential bias-but, again, we would need to know much more about
the details of these provisions' implementation. Does AT&T have written
policies (or performance evaluation factors) to guide employees' decisions
regarding the amount of their first settlement offers to consumers? Do such
policies exist for subsequent settlement offers? On average, how many
times must a consumer refuse AT&T's settlement offers in order to be
offered the full amount of her claim? Do AT&T's employees tend to wait
until just before the selection of the arbitrator to offer the full amount
requested by a consumer? How is the available pool of arbitrators selected
252. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) ("The opportunity to be heard must
be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard").
253. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
254.

See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE ON THE PRESERVATION OF THE JUSTICE

SYSTEM, Report, Crisis in the Courts: Defining the Problem at 3 (2012) (observing that "fourteen

state court systems have been forced to curtail the hours and even entire days they are open");
Gregory J. Linhares & Anne Dannerbeck Janku, "Show Me" Where It Hurts: The Missouri
Approach to Budget Impact Analysis, in NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, FUTURE TRENDS IN

STATE COURTS 2010 80, 82 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2010) (describing process in which
Missouri identified small claims matters as low priority and proposed staffing cuts that would
either delay or deny case processing), available at http://cdml6501.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/
ref/collection/ctadmin/id/1605.
255. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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for these types of cases? How are arbitrators selected for particular cases?
What is the contractual and financial relationship between AT&T and its
arbitral provider(s)? 256 How significant is AT&T's share of each arbitral
provider's gross and net revenues? 257 Is there the potential for the arbitral
provider, or individual arbitrators, to receive bonuses for their work for
AT&T? If yes, what is the basis for those bonuses? What information does
AT&T receive about the claims made by consumers, the results of these
claims and the arbitrators responsible for deciding the claims? How has
AT&T used this information? Has AT&T ever used this information to
improve its products or services? 258 If yes, in what way has AT&T used
this information to improve its services? Etc. These sorts of details
inevitably will matter in determining whether the clause's provisions will
have the effect of reducing bias-or enhancing it.
There are important differences, of course, between the ERISA and
consumer contexts. The ERISA jurisprudence recognizes that employees,
beneficiaries, and the funds collected on their behalf need protection, and
administrators are therefore obligated to operate as fiduciaries. 25 9 in
256. Principles II and V of the Georgetown CPR Principles for ADR Provider Organizations,
supra note 67, which recommend disclosure by dispute resolution organizations, also suggest
many more questions of this type:
II. Information Regarding Services and Operations ADR Provider. Organizations
should take all reasonable steps to provide clear, accurate and understandable information
about the following aspects of their services and operations:
a. The nature of the ADR Provider Organization's services, operations, and fees;
b. The relevant economic, legal, professional or other relationships between the ADR
Provider Organization and its affiliated neutrals;
c. The ADR Provider Organization's policies relating to confidentiality, organizational and
individual conflicts of interests, and ethical standards for neutrals and the Organization;
d. Training and qualifications requirements for neutrals affiliated with the Organization, as
well as other selection criteria for affiliation; and
e. The method by which neutrals are selected for service.
V. Disclosure of Organizational Conflicts of Interest. The ADR Provider Organization
should disclose the existence of any interests or relationships which are reasonably likely to
affect the impartiality or independence of the Organization or which might reasonably create
the appearance that the Organization is biased against a party or favorable to another,
including (i) any financial or other interest by the Organization in the outcome; (ii) any
significant financial, business, organizational, professional or other relationship that the
Organization has with any of the parties or their counsel, including a contractual stream of
referrals, a de facto stream of referrals, or a funding relationship between a party and the
organization; or (iii) any other significant source of bias or prejudice concerning the
Organization which is reasonably likely to affect impartiality or might reasonably create an
appearance of partiality or bias.
257. My thanks go to Professor Jeffrey Stempel for suggesting this question long ago.
258. See e.g., supra note 95 (regarding potential use of ombuds).
259. See Langbein,supra note 145, at 1325-28. The loyalty rule "requires plan fiduciaries to
act 'solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and ... for the exclusive purpose of
... providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries. . ." Id. at 1326. Thus administrators
in the ERISA context are legally barred from acting in the self-interested, selfish manner that can
characterize the contractual relations of commercial parties-and may violate relational norms.
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consumer litigation, American judges have not traditionally been
understood as fiduciaries. They do, however, serve in this role in some
contexts, particularly when individual unsophisticated one-shot players are
perceived as vulnerable to self-interested repeat players. 26 0 There are some
calls for judges to imagine themselves as fiduciaries more frequently.261
If we turn specifically to arbitral organizations and arbitrators,
meanwhile, there is no language in the FAA or in the Supreme Court's
arbitral jurisprudence that establishes a fiduciary duty for them, under any
circumstances.26 2 There is nothing, for example, instructing arbitrators that
they owe a special duty to consumers or employees in disparate party
arbitration-or that in the case of a close call, they should err on the side of
those who are to be served by federal statutes specially enacted to protect
vulnerable people from employment discrimination, consumer fraud, or
mental or physical abuse. It should not be surprising that such language is
missing from the FAA. It was originally enacted to overcome judicial
hostility to the arbitration clauses that had been negotiated by sophisticated
263
lih
In light of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence that
commercial parties.
has expanded the FAA to the disparate party context, it would make sense
for Congress to amend the FAA to provide that in certain specified
contexts-e.g., arbitration of employment discrimination and consumer

See Wible v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 375 F.Supp. 2d 956, 969 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (finding that the

record reflected un-rebutted material and probative evidence that tended to show Aetna's selfinterest caused a breach of its fiduciary obligations to the disability claimant). See also Amy J.
Schmitz, Considerationof "Contracting Culture" in Enforcing Arbitration Provisions, 81 SAINT

JOHN'S L. REv. 123, 158 (2007).
260. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002)
(describing judge as fiduciary in determining whether to approve class settlement); see also Lisa
L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciariesand Fiduciary

Judging, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1239 (2003); Alexandra N. Rothman, Bringing an End to the
Trend: Cutting JudicialApproval and Rejection Out ofNon-Class Mass Settlement, 80 FORD. L.

REv. 319 (2011); Hillary A. Sale, Judges Who Settle, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 377, 389-90 (2011).
261. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, A Fiduciary Theory of
Judging, CALIF. L. REV. _ (forthcoming) (urging that using the principle of fiduciary

relationships assists with a better conceptualization of the judicial role).
262. Interestingly, Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley has suggested that mediators play a
fiduciary role. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding
Principle for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 825-26 (1999)
(suggesting that a mediator occupies a position of trust and has special fiduciary relationship to
both parties in a dispute). See also Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision ofSelf-Determination in
Court-ConnectedMediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?,6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 84-86 (2001) (discussing the related concept of undue influence and exploring whether a

mediated settlement agreement could be set aside based on a mediator's undue influence over a
party).
263.

See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974) (noting that the Federal

Arbitration Act reversed centuries ofjudicial hostility to arbitration agreements).
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matters conducted pursuant to mandatory predispute arbitration clauses in
contracts of adhesion-arbitral organizations and arbitrators are obligated
to act as fiduciaries, with higher-than-marketplace quality standards.
Even in interpreting the current language of the FAA, however, courts
could read a fiduciary understanding into the provisions regarding evident
partiality or arbitrators exceeding their powers, as responsibility for the
protection of consumers, employees and vulnerable others migrates from
private attorneys general battling on behalf of their clients to the factfinding judicial adjuncts handling the many "smaller" cases-involving
messy human dynamics and small financial stakes-that courts perceive
they can no longer handle. If these cases must go to arbitration, it makes
just as much sense in this context as in the ERISA context to import at least
some of the fiduciary guidance and treatment of structural conflict offered
by MetLife v. Glenn.
CONCLUSION

Either with help from the Congress or without it, our society needs our
courts to play their essential role in providing the less-powerful with
meaningful access to a forum where the heady promises contained in
legislation will be aired and compared to reality, where meaningful redress
is possible, and ultimately, where the less-powerful can experience justice.
If the Supreme Court is indeed incentivizing the creation of a national,
private small claims court, it also must assume responsibility for assuring
the sufficiency of the justice-procedural and substantive-provided by
such a court. The Supreme Court can look to its own jurisprudence-the
model in Glenn-for guidance.
This model was itself inspired by
administrative agencies' and regulated industries' practices. It represents
one means to continue to use a deferential standard of judicial review, while
also acknowledging that reliance on privatized tribunals inevitably leads to
perceptions of structural bias and the unacceptably high likelihood of actual
bias-and thus, must be addressed. The model offered by Glenn is also
useful because it assumes that as part of courts' reviewing function, they
can and should incentivize the development of procedural safeguards that
reduce the effects of bias and promote accurate decision-making. Finally,
the model offered by Glenn harnesses private initiative to bring
transparency and accountability to privatized procedures-by encouraging
consumers (and their lawyers) to demand discovery regarding arbitral
providers' internal operations.
These sorts of procedural safeguards, at the very least, are what the
valuable bargaining chip of class waiver should be able to buy.

